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JUDICIAL LOBBYING
J. Jonas AndersonAbstract: Judges who lobby Congress for legal reform tread into an ethical gray area:
lobbying is legally permissible, but generally frowned upon. Currently, there are no legal or
ethical constraints on judges speaking publicly regarding proposed legislative changes, only
an ill-defined norm against the practice. Scholars have largely dismissed judicial lobbying
efforts as the result of haphazard, one-off events, driven by the unique interests, expertise, or
ideology of the individual judge involved. According to scholars, there is nothing that should
be done-not to mention little that could be done-to restrict judges from lobbying.
Judicial lobbying occurs, in large part, when Congress proposes jurisdictional changes:
judges lobby when the scope of their review may change. Yet, jurisdictional issues raise
concerns about the judiciary's biases when it comes to lobbying. To further explore this
point, this Article explores the case of specialized courts' involvement in legislative lobbying
efforts. Specialized courts have more opportunities to lobby Congress on jurisdiction because
any legislative change to the subject matter under the specialized court's purview is likely to
alter the court's jurisdiction.
This Article argues that in certain instances lobbying by specialized judges ought to be
curtailed. Lobbying by specialized courts raises unique issues that may not be present when
judges on generalized courts lobby. Namely, specialized court lobbying may sacrifice longheld judicial virtues, including due process and impartiality, virtues which are fundamental to
the legitimacy of the judiciary. This Article examines potential solutions to check such
lobbying, and offers a partial solution that leverages the wisdom of the judicial branch, as a
whole, to minimize those concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, federal district judge John Bates wrote three unsolicited
letters to Congress opposing the USA FREEDOM Act.' The Act would
have imposed new limits on the U.S. government's ability to monitor
email and phone communications of American citizens.2 In Judge
Bates's view, the USA Freedom Act suffered from three fundamental
problems: it would have limited the government's ability to "pursue
potentially valuable intelligence-gathering activities,"3 it would have

1. Letter from John Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2014); Letter from John Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Mike
Rogers, Chairman, Permanent Senate Comm. on Intelligence (May 13, 2014); Letter from John
Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug.
5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Leahyletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6HTDPG].
2. USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). The distinctly modified USA
Freedom Act was passed in June 2015. USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268
(2015). The new act renews all provisions of the Patriot Act, except for the mass collection of data
under § 215. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, US. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2,2015, at Al.
3. Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supranote 1.
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needlessly complicated the work of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISA Court),4 and it was "potentially unconstitutional."5 The
propriety of Judge Bates's efforts to persuade Congress was
controversial, challenged by both academic commentators and federal
judges. 6 Controversy swirled around the fact that, at the time Judge
Bates urged Congress to kill the USA Freedom Act, he was the
Presiding Judge of the FISA court-the court given responsibility for
enforcing the law.7 Judge Bates was expressing his views on the
substantive merits of a bill, before a case challenging that bill had been
filed.' However, such "lobbying" of Congress by Federal judges is
permitted, although traditionally it has been disfavored.9
The tension inherent with judges lobbying for or against bills that
they will eventually interpret has not been overlooked by academics.10
4. Id. at 4-5 (arguing that it would impede the courts' ability "to complete their work in a timely
fashion").
5. Id.
6. For example, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit wrote to Congress expressing his
disapproval of Judge Bates's actions. Letter from Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 14, 2014),
[https://perma.cc/XZ9Ghttp://images.politico.com/global/2014/08/20/kozinskitoleahy.html
5NEM].
7. Stephen 1. Vladeck, Judge Bates (Unintentionally) Makes the Case for FISC Reform, JUST
SECURITY BLOG (July 22, 2015, 2:57 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org [https://perma.cc/YC86QJX7]; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA "Special Advocate," 2 TEx. A&M L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 17-18) (detailing Judge Bates's criticism of the special
advocate).
8. Just such a challenge was brought three days after the bill was signed. Motion in Opposition to
the Government's Imminent or Recently-Made Request to Resume Bulk Data Collection Under
Patriot Act § 215, Kucinelli v. Obama, No. 15-01 (FISA Ct. June 5, 2015).
9. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 82, 97 (1968) ("Federal judicial power is limited to those
disputes which confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.").
10. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY,

ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY

181-82

(1964)

(examining limits on judicial speech); Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found:
Redefining the Judiciary'sImperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1241-48 (1996)

(proposing ways to enable judicial lobbying); Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1709, 1723-53 (1998) (arguing for a role (both historic and contemporary) for judges as
"advicegivers"); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Extra-JudicialActivities of Supreme Court Justices:
Where Should the Line Be Drawn?, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 494 (1983) (reviewing BRUCE A. MURPHY,
AN INQUIRY STIMULATED BY THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION-THE SECRET
POLITICAL AcTIVTTEs OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982)); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial
Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U.

ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 163, 189-91 (1991) (detailing judicial lobbying efforts). While the topic
of individual courts and lobbying has been canvassed, less work has been done on the broader
question of which courts lobby and why. See, e.g., Roger E. Hartley, "It's Called Lunch": Judicial
Ethics and the Political and Legal Space for the Judiciaryto "Lobby," 56 ARIZ. L. REv. 383, 386
(2014) ("[Tjhere has been relatively little scholarship on how courts do intergovernmental relations
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Judicial lobbying can be viewed as merely a way for the judicial branch
to communicate with Congress, part of the long history of dialogue
between Congress and the courts." Ever since Alexander Bickel's
groundbreaking work on the dialogic nature of the court-Congress
relationship, scholars have exhaustively examined the ways that judges
influence congressional law-making. 12 In this vein, scholars have
identified a host of ways in which judges engage in constitutional
dialogue with Congress: by declaring statutes unconstitutional, by
interpreting statutory language, and by exercising what Bickel called
"the passive virtues" that enable courts to avoid deciding constitutional
questions.1

But a dialogic account of judicial lobbying must account for the fact
that, in certain instances, judges urging a certain action by Congress may
sacrifice any judicial claim of neutrality. 14 Judge Bates's recent actions
serve as a cautionary tale demonstrating the pitfalls inherent with
judicial lobbying. 15 But the phenomenon of judges lobbying Congress is
not unique to Judge Bates. For instance, in 2010, while Congress was
debating significant reforms to the U.S. patent system, Chief Judge

work .... "); John W. Winkle n11, InterbranchPolitics: The Administrative Office of the US. Courts
as Liaison, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 43, 43 (2003) ("Lobbying by the judiciary and its intermediaries
remains a topic of low salience on research agendas.").
11. See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and

FederalJurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (analyzing Congress's and the Supreme Court's
respective powers when it comes to federal jurisdiction); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953)

(discussing the congressional power to limit jurisdiction); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537 (1997) (debating Congress's and courts' relative
powers); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress' Power to Restrict the

Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983) (discussing the unending
debate about courts' power to determine jurisdiction); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the

Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (discussing the relative power of the courts and
Congress).
12. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 186

n.10 (1981) (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review and democracy); J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 5-17 (2012) (arguing against a comprehensive
constitutional theory); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47

IND. L.J. 1, 3-10 (1971) (defending originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation as a means
of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a democratic system).
13. The "passive virtues" receive a thorough treatment in Bickel's work. See, e.g., Alexander M.

Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,42-47 (1961) (discussing the different
matters in which the courts avoid constitutional questions).
14. See Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE

L.J. 1643, 1649-52 (1985) (discussing obstacles to achieving judicial fairness and balance).
15. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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Michel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit wrote to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, urging Congress to eliminate various
aspects of the pending legislation. 16 Chief Judge Michel was arguing that
Congress need not act; instead, Chief Judge Michel suggested that his
court could handle the heavy lifting of reforming the patent system.17
Like Judge Bates, Chief Judge Michel was lobbying Congress about a
law that had yet to be enacted, but would have been reviewed by his
court if enacted.
The reality that active judges often lobby Congress on legislation
which will be interpreted by their courts raises three primary
constitutional and ethical questions. First, do judicial lobbying efforts
impinge upon the Constitution's separation of powers? Second, to what
degree do judicial lobbying efforts violate judicial ethics, both formal
and informal? Third, does judicial lobbying undermine fairness and
equity in the administration of justice?
As to the first question, there are sound reasons to think that the
Constitution does not preclude judicial lobbying. Despite the
Constitution's delegation of separate powers to the legislature and the
judiciary, the branches do not persist in what Benjamin Cardozo called
"proud and silent isolation."18 For example, lobbying does not appear to
involve any use of the "legislative power" that is reserved for Congress
alone; lobbying is not the power to legislatel 9 Furthermore, although
lobbying is likely outside the scope of Article III's judicial power,
individual judges can engage with legislation outside of their court
duties.20
The second question-concerning the formal ethical limits on judicial
lobbying-is more difficult to answer. There is active disagreement
about the extent to which the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
curtails judges' ability to lobby Congress. 21 Despite this debate, the
16. See J. Jonas Anderson, PatentDialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1069-76 (2014) (describing in
detail Chief Judge Michel's actions).
17. Id.; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917 (2011)

(discussing courts and patent reform).
18. Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry ofJustice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 114 (1921).
19. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1193 ("When judges propose, draft, testify on, and lobby for or
against legislative reform, they do not usurp a legislative power that the Constitution vests in

Congress alone.").
20. See, e.g., Maeva Marcus & Emily F. Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal
System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 41-42 (Robert

A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (distinguishing permissible individual consultations between Congress and
judges with impermissible institutional pronouncements on pending legislation).
21. See infra Section i.B.
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Judicial Conference has interpreted the limits on judicial lobbying quite
liberally, resulting in few formal ethical restrictions on the practice. 22
Informally, however, judges have developed strong norms against
lobbying on issues that do not directly touch on the practice of judging,
23
norms that are often flouted in practice.
As for the last question, when judges lobby they run the risk of
sacrificing the neutrality and even-handedness that is critical for the
judicial branch's legitimacy.24 Federal judges who comment on policy
matters invariably run the risk of prejudicing, or appearing to prejudice,
future cases.25 Thus, additional checks on the excesses of judicial
lobbying ought to be established. Any such checks, however, should not
silence judicial voices on policy. Judicial input is often an invaluable
insight into the administration of proposed laws. 26 Judges often represent
unbiased, informed opinions, as demonstrated by the frequency with
which lawmakers adopt judicial suggestions on legislative matters.27
Furthermore, absolute limits on judicial lobbying would likely violate
the First Amendment.2 8 A more surgical approach is required.
Towards that end, this Article examines ways to oversee lobbying
efforts, particularly by specialized courts. Specialized courts are
particularly influenced by repeat litigants and can suffer from tunnel
vision on policy matters, vulnerabilities that are exacerbated when
judges lobby.2 9 Specialized courts may be more incentivized to lobby for
policy changes because the administrative impacts of legislative policy
changes are greater for specialized courts than they are for courts of
general jurisdiction. 30 This phenomenon is well illustrated by Judge
22. Id.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, JudgingPolitics: The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of
PoliticalFairness, 71 TaX. L. REv. 1643 (1992) (debating the myriad ways in which judicial review
of political fairness can be categorized).
25. Justice Harry Blackmun wrote, "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on
its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407
(1989).
26. See Smith, supra note 10, at 190 ("Congress is especially receptive to communication from
judicial officers when the judges appear to speak with a unified voice.").
27. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT

ADMINISTRATION 38-39 (1995) (concluding that "Congressional deference" to judicial thoughts on
legislation can be explained by a lack of knowledge and interest in court administration).
28. See J. Clark Kelso, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on ExtrajudicialSpeech by Judges,

28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 851, 851-55 (1995) (applying the First Amendment to judicial speech).
29. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, SpecializedAdjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 380 (discussing
capture of specialized courts).
30. See id at 381 (stating that specialized courts' jurisdiction, combined with their isolation, put
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Bates, a generalist federal district judge who lobbied Congress only after
appointment to a specialized court.3 1
Judges have traditionally been involved in congressional debates
about court jurisdiction and reform.32 For specialized courts, the
traditional division between lobbying on judicial reform measures and
lobbying on general policy reform measures is meaningless; substantive
legal change inevitably impacts the administration of specialized
courts.33 Specialization blurs the already amorphous boundary between
substantive and procedural legislative changes: for specialized courts
policy and jurisdiction are essentially indistinguishable.34 Thus, to the
degree one is troubled by judicial lobbying, specialized courts represent
an important focus for any reform proposal.
This Article's argument proceeds in four parts. Part I frames the
inquiry by briefly describing scholarly approaches to court-Congress
dialogue, of which lobbying plays a significant, if underappreciated role.
Part II illustrates that judges engage in lobbying on substantive policy
issues. This Part also examines the case of specialized courts as lobbyists
to better understand the phenomenon.
Part III explores the practical and theoretical limits on federal judges
who attempt to influence legislators. It examines possible Constitutional,
statutory, and formal ethical restrictions on the practice, as well as
informal norms. Ultimately, the primary restrictions on judicial lobbying
are practical in nature: judges are commonly thought to be free to lobby
about issues impacting the judiciary, but are discouraged from lobbying
about general policy issues out of respect for the legislature.
Part IV turns to the central normative and theoretical issues
underlying judicial lobbying. First, this Part theorizes specialized courts'
interest in lobbying. Second, it asks the fundamental questions of
whether we should be concerned with judicial lobbying, and if so, how
we should reduce the amount of lobbying that judges undertake. After
analyzing various arguments for regulating judicial lobbying, this Part
concludes that judicial lobbying on policy matters can be problematic for
the effective administration of justice. It suggests various ways to
them at risk of group-think).
31. One will note that his contemporaries on the court had an opposite reaction; they lobbied that
the bill imposed constructive boundaries on the FISA Court. See infra Section II.B.3.b.
32. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1187-91 (discussing the judiciary's elevated role in procedural
reform).
33. See Anderson, supranote 16, at 1090-93 (analyzing how the Federal Circuit was impacted by
patent reform).
34. Id.
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improve oversight ofjudicial lobbying.
I.

THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND LIMITS
ON JUDICIAL LOBBYING

Modem constitutional scholarship has paid particular attention to
resolving the tension between democracy and judicial review.35 The socalled "counter-majoritarian difficulty" has spawned numerous books
and articles attempting to reconcile the reality of unelected judges
reviewing,
and at times invalidating, democratically-created
36
legislation. Scholars have looked for means by which judges can
reduce the tension created by undemocratic judicial review. 3 7 One of the
most well-known solutions is Alexander Bickel's suggestion that courts
employ the "passive virtues" of judicial reasoning 38-refusing to decide
cases on substantive grounds if narrower grounds for a decision exist.
Scholars have also identified a host of ways in which judges engage in
constitutional "dialogue" with Congress: by declaring statutes
unconstitutional, by interpreting statutory language, and by exercising
"the passive virtues" that enable courts to avoid deciding constitutional
questions.39 These scholarly attempts to decipher the contours of the
judicial-legislative relationship have focused almost exclusively on
formal interactions: dialogue via official duties.4 0 In other words,
scholars have focused on the dialogue that occurs when judges judge and
when legislators legislate.
Some scholars, though, have studied the informal channels of
35. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1709 ("Contemporary constitutional law is preoccupied with the
antidemocratic nature ofjudicial review.").
36. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 12, at 186 (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review
and democracy); WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 17-28 (arguing against a comprehensive
constitutional theory); Bork, supra note 12, at 3-10 (defending originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation as a means of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a
democratic system).
37. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 12, at 186 (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review
and democracy);

WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 17-28

(arguing against a comprehensive

constitutional theory); Bork, supra note 12, at 3-10 (defending originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation as a means of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a
democratic system).
38. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986).

39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 10, at 386 (noting that "there has been relatively little
scholarship" on courts lobbying); John W. Winkle M, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform
in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263, 263 (1985) ("Judicial influence outside of adjudication, however,
is an understudied but nonetheless important phenomenon.").
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communication between the branches. 4 1 The study of "extrajudicial"
speech by judges and the restrictions on such speech have greatly
enhanced understanding of judicial-congressional dialogue.42 Generally,
scholars have concluded that judicial lobbying is unsightly.43 Walter
Murphy, a scholar of the judicial role, has said that lobbying "is contrary
to the public image of a judge."44 Judicial lobbying, it is thought, is only
appropriate when an issue is "of such gravity" that it demands judicial
intervention. 4 5 Taking this view, judges are thought to lobby on issues of
particular interest to the judiciary. Thus, commentators have looked
approvingly upon judicial lobbying efforts in areas such as lower court
reorganization proposals, 46 the use of magistrate judges, 47 and judicial
salary increases.4 8 Judicial lobbying is perceived by most scholars to be
both reasonable and rare, with judges appropriately lobbying about
judicial administration while refraining from commenting on more
general legislative policy. Judges are thought to lobby Congress over
issues that directly impact the performance of the judiciary's duties, and
no others.49
But this perception of judicial lobbying is far from complete. Judges
routinely testify before Congress about matters related to pending

41. There have been some treatments of particular lobbying efforts, including Judith Resnik, The
ProgrammaticJudiciary:Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74

S. CAL. L. REv. 269, 287-90 (2000) (examining Chief Justice Rehnquist's involvement in the
Violence Against Women Act). Some work has been done on the institutions that the judiciary
employs to perform lobbying. See Winkle, supra note 10, at 50 (detailing the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts' role in judicial lobbying).
42. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT

ADMINISTRATION 131 (1995) (concluding that judges are "well positioned" to shape legislation that
"will affect court administration"); Geyh, supra note 10, at 1168, 1234-49 (detailing the judiciary's
role in statutory reform and rulemaking); Kelso, supra note 28, at 851-55 (describing extrajudicial
speech); Katyal, supranote 10, at 1711 (arguing that "advicegiving" to Congress is a role embraced
by judges).
43. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1711; Winkle, supra note 40, at 272-73 (detailing the role
judges played in "court reform").
44. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 178.

45. Id. at 179.
46. SMITH, supra note 42, at 18 (citing judicial lobbying for the creation of the Eleventh Circuit
as an example of "tremendous influence" that judges can wield over the court reform process).
47. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 164-67 (describing judicial officers attempt to influence the
legislative branch).
48. See, e.g., id. at 173.
49. Cf Kelso, supra note 28, at 863 (arguing for restrictions on judicial speech); William G.
Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589,

623-24 (1989) (proposing limits on extra-judicial speech).
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legislation.50 They also, at times, reach out to Congress in their
individual capacities to urge Congress to act in a particular policy area.51
In fact, lobbying is such an institutionalized practice of the federal
judiciary that an entire organization, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, exists with the explicit goal of lobbying for judicial
interests.52 Indeed, judges often lobby Congress over policy issues that
have merely tangential, if any, impact on the judiciary.53 This calls into
question the value that this more informal dialogue-judges opining on
potential legislation-has on judicial-congressional relations. If the
neutrality of the judiciary is sacrificed through lobbying, should judges
be restrained from lobbying members of Congress?
At this point, a definition of what constitutes lobbying is appropriate.
"Lobbying" can be a broad concept that encompasses any actions
intended to influence decisions made by government officials.5 4
However, this Article adopts a narrower view of what constitutes
lobbying activities. First, this Article focuses only on lobbying activities
by judges outside of their official duties of deciding cases. Judges
frequently write opinions that are meant to influence legislators, but such
official dialogue has been well-chronicled in the legal and political
science literature." Second, it considers only uninvited lobbying efforts.
Oftentimes judges are requested by Congress to provide input on a
particular policy debate, whether through congressional testimony,
written statements, or other forms of communication.56 Conversely, this
Article is focused on what motivates judges to spontaneously engage in

50. See infra Part II.
51. For example, judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit actively lobbied
Congress to split the old Fifth Circuit into two. See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER,
A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL

REFORM, (1988).
52. See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, Funding the Federal Judiciary: The
Congressional Connection, 69 JUDICATURE 45, 47 (1986) (describing the role of the Judicial
Conference).
53. See infra Part II.
54. This discussion relies generally on DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

(1951).
55. See Katyal, supranote 10, at 1727-1800 (listing instances in which judges give advice to the
legislature); J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of PatentReform at the FederalCircuit, 63

AM. U. L. REV. 961, 981-1004 (2014) (detailing how the Federal Circuit interacted with Congress
regarding patents through its opinions).
56. See Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, "Separatenessbut Interdependence, Autonomy but
Reciprocity": A First Look at Federal Judges' Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46

MERCER L. REV. 667, 669-75 (1995) (finding that Congress nearly always took the advice ofjudges
when lobbying on issues of judicial functioning).
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policy debates outside of their official capacities; thus, invitations to
address Congress are less relevant to that discussion. This rather narrow
definition of lobbying limits that term to a judge's unsolicited views
about pending legislative action which occurs outside of his or her role
as judicial decision-maker.
A.

Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on JudicialLobbying

This section examines the restrictions on judicial lobbying by
examining potential constitutional, statutory, ethical, and norms-based
restraints on judges speaking about legislation. Ultimately, it concludes
that there are no legal restrictions, just a judicial norm against the
practice. This freedom can be a good thing, providing breathing room
for constructive dialogue. But the lack of formal restrictions can lead to
lobbying that threatens judicial neutrality.
One of the most commonly invoked arguments against judges
attempting to influence legislation is that such judicial lobbying efforts
violate constitutional principles of separation of powers." There is no
explicit separation of powers clause within the Constitution, rather the
separation is implied within the Constitution's structure.58 The first three
articles of the Constitution vest "all" legislative powers with Congress,
"the executive [p]ower" in the President, and "the judicial [p]ower" with
the courts.59 Scholars have debated the limits placed on each branch by
the separation of powers, developing a rich and extremely thorough
literature on the topic. 60

Regardless of one's viewpoint on the separation of powers, there are
at least two sound reasons to think that the Constitution does not
preclude judicial lobbying. First, discussing legislation with members of
Congress-in an official capacity or otherwise-does not involve any
use of the "legislative power." 61 Courts and judges do not impinge upon
57. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1192 ("The separation of powers is often identified as an
impediment to interbranch cooperation in legislative reform.").
58. See, e.g., Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of

Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 395-99 (1935) (describing the doctrine as part of the fabric of
American society).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id art. I, § 1.
60. The literature is too immense to summarize. As a more recent example of the kinds of
separation of powers concerns that are inviting to scholars, see generally Neal K. Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most DangerousBranch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 100

(2006) (questioning whether the executive branch should be regulated from within).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; Geyh, supra note 10, at 1193 ("When judges propose, draft,
testify on, and lobby for or against legislative reform, they do not usurp a legislative power that the
Constitution vests in Congress alone.").
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the legislature's delegated power when they publically announce their
views on public policy.6 2 They, like other members of the public, are
merely seeking to influence Congress in its law-making role.63 Such
attempts to influence do not usurp the legislative branch's designated
role. 4
Second, Article III of the Constitution does not forbid judges from
engaging with legislation outside of their duties as a judge. The
executive and legislative branches regularly comment on and critique the
work of the judicial branch; the President and Congress often suggest
that the Supreme Court should decide important cases in particular
ways. 6 5 In fact, the executive branch is a regular litigant in federal court,
not only as a defendant but often as a plaintiff.66 Scholars have suggested
that Congress is not restricted in using the courts and should engage
more directly with the judicial branch in court.67 While engaging with
the judicial branch is not a constitutional requirement, it certainly does
not violate the separation of powers for Congress to do so. 68 In the same
way, judges do not violate their constitutionally-granted duties by
engaging with the legislature outside of official duties.
The absence of constitutional restrictions on judicial lobbying does
not end the inquiry into the legal limits of the practice, however.6 9 18
U.S.C. § 1913 forbids government employees from lobbying Congress
using "money appropriated by any enactment of Congress." 70 On first
glance, this would appear to preclude judicial lobbying because judges
are clearly governmental employees. There are two exceptions to this
prohibition, however, which greatly remove any barriers for Article III
judges who wish to lobby Congress. The first of these exceptions
permits government employees to engage with Congress if a member of

62. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 678-83 (1993)
(addressing the separation of powers conflict that arises when judges lobby Congress).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on the Judiciary, in CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE
COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN LAWMAKING 21, 21-28 (Colton C.

Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2002).
66. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REv. 914, 917 (2012) ("As matters stand
today, however, the executive branch plays the dominant role in federal litigation.").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 41-42 (distinguishing permissible individual
consultations between Congress and judges with impermissible institutional pronouncements on
pending legislation).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012).
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Congress requests advice.' Thus, any congressional request for input
from a particular judge, court, or the entire judicial branch frees judges
to respond to the request. In fact, the Judicial Conference strictly adheres
to this first exception, communicating with Congress only when
72
requested to do so by a member of Congress.
The second exception to the limitation on government employee
lobbying is the "proper official channels" exception.73 For legislation
that is deemed "necessary for the efficient conduct of the public
business," governmental employees may lobby Congress only via
"proper official channels." 74 On its face, this exception appears to limit
judicial lobbying to activities carried out by the Judicial Conferencethe formal lobbying arm of the judiciary-and then only on courtspecific matters that are necessary for the efficient administration of
justice. As noted above, the Judicial Conference rarely invokes this
exception, however, choosing instead to wait for Congress to solicit the
judiciary's input on legislation.7 5
Despite the apparent restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Comptroller
General (C.G.) of the United States has interpreted the statute's
exceptions quite broadly. The C.G. has ruled that judicial
communications with Congress always fall within the "official channels"
exception because individual Article III judges have no direct supervisor
and are "arguably" their own "agency spokesperson." 76 Thus, according
to the C.G., individual judges are limited in lobbying Congress only
insofar as the issues to which they address their efforts "would have an
impact on the judiciary." 77 Thus, according to the C.G., in nearly every
imaginable case, judicial lobbying is not subject to statutory limitation.
Every potential policy issue has an "impact," no matter how small, on
the judiciary. Thus, in practice, judges are only limited to lobbying on
7 1. Id.
72. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1196 (critiquing the Judicial Conference's "utterly unnecessary"
requirement to participate in the legislative process only when invited to do so).

73. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Smith, supranote 10, at 167-70.
74. Geyh, supranote 10, at 1195 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1913).
75. See Resnik, supra note 41, at 278-82 (reciting the history of the Judicial Conference's
reluctance to comment on pending legislation absent a directive from Congress).
76. See Letter from Comptroller Gen. of the U.S. to Jeremiah Denton, Senator (Sept. 26, 1984), in
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 63 DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES 626 (1985) [hereinafter Letter to Jeremiah Denton].
77. Id.
78. See Smith, supra note 10, at 169 (stating that the interpretation of the rule allows courts and

Congress to communicate "without narrowly construing the requirement that such communications
pass through 'official channels').
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issues that would "impact . .. the judiciary": a threshold that is easily
met in virtually every case.
B.

FormalEthicalLimits on JudicialLobbying

The behavior of federal judges is regulated not only by constitutional
and statutory limitations, but also by formal ethical rules. In 1973, the
Federal Judicial Conference adopted a Code of Conduct for United

States Judges ("Judicial Code of Conduct").so Although the Judicial
Code of Conduct is non-binding, it is widely followed and regularly
consulted by the Judicial Conference when determining whether a judge
has violated his or her ethical obligations and when determining whether
to institute corrective measures.
Canon 2 of the Judicial Code of Conduct states that judges should
"act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 82 This general provision
provides a standard for judicial lobbying activities, but it does not
provide specific limits on such activities. Similarly, Canon 3 of the
Judicial Code of Conduct provides that a "judge should not make public
comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court." 83
Judge Calebresi of the Second Circuit recently drew criticism when he
commented publically that it "would be too bad" if the Supreme Court
reversed his decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway,8 4 a case examining
whether a prayer prior to a city meeting violated the Establishment
Clause. 5 If a judge were to comment publically on a pending case while
lobbying Congress, he would be in clear violation of Canon 3 of the
Judicial Code of Conduct.
Canons 2 and 3 of the Judicial Code of Conduct set out the basic
scope of judicial ethical limits on extrajudicial speech. But they are
79. See Letter to Jeremiah Denton, supranote 76, at 626.
80. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES

(2009).
81. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Judicial-Conduct-and-Discipline-(2010),
COURTS
English--2.19.14.pdf/Sfile/Judicial-Conduct-and-Discipline--English-2.19.14.pdf
[https://perna.cc/5SNR-BKRS].
82. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol 2.: Ethics and Judicial
Conduct, ch. 2, Canon 2(A) (2014).
83. Id. at ch. 2, Canon 3(A)(6).
84. _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
85. Ed Whelan, Judge Calebresi's Flagrant Ethical Violation, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Mar. 31,
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/374615/judge-calabresis-flagrant-ethical2014),
violation-ed-whelan [https://perma.cc/N6U8-QLL7].
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unhelpfully broad in defining limits on judicial speech. Canon 4 of the
Code of Conduct is perhaps more helpful. It provides that:
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including lawrelated pursuits . . .. However, a judge should not participate in
extrajudicial activities that detract from the dignity of the
judge's office, interfere with the performance of the judge's
official duties, reflect adversely on the judge's impartiality, [or]
lead to frequent disqualification ....
A. Law-relatedActivities
1. Speaking, Writing, and Teaching. A judge may speak, write,
lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
2. Consulting. A judge may consult with or appear at a public
hearing before an executive or legislative body or official
(a) on matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the
administration ofjustice;
(b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a
judge's judicial experience provides special expertise in the
area; or
(c) when the judge is actin pro se in a matter involving the
judge or the judge's interest.
Canon 4 of the Judicial Code of Conduct clearly permits judicial
lobbying about issues for which a "judge's judicial experience provides
special expertise in the area." 87 One can debate about whether Canon 4
permits judicial lobbying in legal areas that do not directly touch on
matters directed at the judiciary, but an amendment to the ethical rules in
2008 (which added section 4(A)(1)) removed any doubts that may have
existed as to the propriety of judicial lobbying. In the commentary to
Canon 4, judges are encouraged to opine on legislation:
As a judicial officer and a person specially learned in the law, a
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice, including revising
substantive and procedural law and improving criminal and
juvenile justice. To the extent that the judge's time permits and
impartiality is not compromised, the judge is encouraged to do
so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial
conference, or other organization dedicated to the law.88
86. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 82, at ch. 1, Canon 4(A)(1)-(2).
87. Id. at Canon 4(A)(2)(b).
88. Id. at Canon 4, Commentary.
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Thus, there appear to be few formal ethical restrictions on judicial
lobbying activity. Of course, judges should not comment on pending
cases under Canon 3, but they face few restrictions in commenting on
legislation. What questions remained regarding judicial speech were
entirely laid to rest with the adoption of Canon 4(A)(1). As long as
judges refrain from commenting about current cases, they may lobby
Congress.
C.

Informal Restrictions on JudicialLobbying

Although there appear to be few formal constitutional, statutory, or
ethical restraints on judicial lobbying, a strong norm has developed
which limits judicial lobbying efforts to a single subject: judicial
reform.89 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the reasons for such
restraint in his 1993 Year-End Report for the Federal Judiciary:
[W]hat is an appropriate sentence for a particular offense, and
similar matters, are questions upon which a judge's view should
carry no more weight than the view of any other citizen. In such
cases I do not believe that the Judicial Conference . . should
take an official position. 90
While the specifics of Justice Rehnquist's statement have been
questioned (some believe that sentencing is an area of "special
expertise" for the judiciary), his broader point that individual judges
should avoid commenting on statutes that do not concern judicial
administration-even if not ethically or legally prohibited-is almost
universally accepted. 91 Chief Justice Burger noted the demarcation
between judges advising on broad policy matters and judges advising on
court-specific matters:
Justices have come to realize that they should avoid advising
Presidents and the Congress on substantive policy questions but
on matters relating to the courts there must be joint consultation.
89. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 46, at 258 ("The idea of judicial lobbying is anathema to
many. It somehow seems inappropriate for federal judges, whose adjudicative role requires
neutrality rather than advocacy, to urge the passage or defeat of proposed legislation. In spite of its
negative connotations, however, lobbying is nothing more than communicating information and
considered opinion to the appropriate decisionmakers. No one has more accurate information on
matters of judicial administration or is in a better position to comment on conditions facing the
courts than the federal judge.").
90. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 1994 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

(Dec. 30, 1994).
91. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 852 (stating the universal acceptance of informal restrictions on
extrajudicial lobbying); Winkle, supra note 40, at 273 (arguing judges should provide input to
Congress, as long as they do not "subvert" judicial ideals).
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The separation of powers does not preclude such
consultation .... To be sure, there is a great and necessary
tradition of insulation of judges from political activities
generally But participation in legisiatve and executive
decisions which affect the judicial system is an absolute
obligation of judges.92
This norm against pronouncements of general policy by the judiciary
has developed in response to two primary concerns about overbroad
judicial lobbying. First, commentators have worried that excessive
judicial lobbying undermines the neutrality of the judicial office.93 If
judges are engaged in legislative battles, how can they then coldly
review the resulting legislation from those battles? Second,
commentators have worried that widespread judicial lobbying would
undermine the legitimacy of the federal judiciary. 9 4 The public's
confidence in the judiciary and Congress's respect for the finality of
judicial review could both be undermined if judges are unfettered in
their lobbying activities.9 5
An obvious objection to judicial lobbying is the prohibition on
judicial advisory opinions. The restriction on advisory opinions has a
long, nearly unbroken pedigree in the United States.96 In 1793, thenSecretary of State Thomas Jefferson requested legal advice from the
Supreme Court regarding certain treaty matters with France.97 In
response, Chief Justice John Jay declined to advise the President."
Citing separation of powers concerns and the Court's status as a "court
of last resort," he argued "against the propriety of ... extra-judicially

92. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1815-16 (quoting Warren E. Burger, Accepting the FordhamStein Award (Oct. 25, 1978)).
93. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 852 ("Many-I hope most-would agree that something is
wrong with supreme court justices actively opposing a ballot proposition in an attempt to influence
the vote.").
94. See Abner K. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to ProfessorNeal

Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (1998) ("The closer the judicial decision-making process
comes to the political process, the more suspect the particular decision becomes.").
9 5. Id.
96. The one exception appears to be President Monroe's request from the Supreme Court for an
opinion on whether the federal government could use federal money for internal improvements. The
Court answered in the affirmative. E. F. Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in Federal Supreme

Court, 23 GEO. L.J. 643, 644 (1935).
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (July 12, 1793), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 744 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,

1998); see also William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices'Most Significant Opinion, 29
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 173, 174-85 (2002) (detailing the history of the John Jay letter).
9 8. Id.
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deciding the questions."" Jay's refusal to provide an advisory opinion
was formally acknowledged over a century later in Muskrat v. United
States,1" with the Court holding that it was unable to01provide "opinions
in the nature of advice concerning legislative action."'
When judges engage in lobbying for particular bills, their actions may
be seen as akin to advisory opinions. Lobbying exposes a judge's
opinion on the merits (or lack thereof) of legislative action before that
action has been formally challenged in court. 102 Opponents of such bills

may rightly feel that a judge could not objectively evaluate the
constitutionality of a bill for which he or she has previously voiced
support or opposition.
Concerns about judicial fairness are raised even when actions by a
judge do not rise to the level of an advisory opinion. Merely voicing
support or disfavor for a particular policy action, even if not directed at a
specific piece of legislation, could undermine the appearance of judicial
neutrality. 10 3 For example, if a judge were to write an op-ed in favor of
eliminating all obscenity laws, a prosecutor bringing an obscenity case
might legitimately question that judge's ability to even-handedly
adjudge his or her case. 104
Many commentators are troubled by the erosion of public goodwill
that might occur when judges engage in lobbying.10 5 Legislators are
elected by the people to craft policy.1 06 They actively debate policy goals
while running for election. 107 After being elected, they solicit the views
of experts, constituents, lobbyists, and other interest groups. 08 A

99. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND
PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1890).

100. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
101. Id. at 362.
102. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1804-05 (stating "[tihere are good reasons" to have a case or
controversy requirement, including legislative interference).
103. See Stephen Reinhart, JudicialSpeech and the Open Judiciary, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 805,
805 (1995) ("Concerns about fairness and the appearance of fairness far outweigh any benefits that
might result from such speech. . . .").
104. Consider the case of Judge Alex Kozinski, who recused himself in an obscenity trial after
sexually explicit material was found on his website. Scott Glover, U.S. Judge in Obscenity Trial
Steps Down, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/14/local/mekozinskil4 [https://perma.cc/A24N-7DDY].
105. See Winkle III, supra note 40, at 265 ("Lobbying ... may impair the adjudicative function,
jeopardize impartiality, or compromise the integrity of the court.").
106. See Mikva, supra note 94, at 1828-29 (comparing the legislative decision-making process to
the judicial decision-making process).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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deliberative process of drafting, voting, and redrafting of legislative
provisions occurs in committee and then in the congressional
chambers. 109 The same process occurs in the other congressional
chamber before a bill is sent along to the President.11 0 The deliberative,
democratic nature of the legislative process is what legitimizes the laws
that Congress ultimately adopts.'
In contrast, the judicial decision-making process is designed to
severely limit the types of information and viewpoints that can be
consulted."i 2 Judges are generally precluded from relying on information
found outside of the official record of a case.1 3 Legal decisions are not
meant to be policy decisions.' 14 They are intended to be insulated, to
some degree, from the influences of outside interests. To the extent that
judges step outside of their roles as judges and enter into the legislative
realm, they may be sacrificing the virtues that separate them from their
legislative colleagues.' '5
II.

JUDICIAL LOBBYING

Judges frequently promote or challenge legislative proposals-they
lobby.' 16 Their lobbying efforts have not been limited to issues of
judicial administration, either." As this Part will demonstrate, judges
have been very active in lobbying on a broad range of policy matters.
For instance, judges have played key roles in matters of court
organization, including actively lobbying for and against splitting the
Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. 1' 8 The Fifth Circuit was
eventually split, largely on the basis of unanimous support from the
circuit's judges while the Ninth Circuit has yet to be split due to

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
corpus
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1829.
See id
See id.
Id.
See Winkle i, supra note 40, at 264-72 (chronicling the lobbying efforts around habeas
reform).
See infra section I.B.
118. See generally BARROW & WALKER, supra note 51 (discussing, in general, the Fifth Circuit
divide); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the
UnitedStates Court ofAppeals for the Ninth CircuitIs Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 917
(1990) (arguing against dividing the Ninth Circuit).
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widespread opposition from the judges in that circuit." 9 Judges have
also been heavily involved in debates about sentencing reform.1 20 But
judges have also been active on policy questions that have little to do
with judicial efficiency or issues that involve judicial discretion,
including patent reform, bankruptcy reform, and tax reform, among
others. 121
This Part briefly describes historical judicial lobbying efforts. Then, it
analyzes modem judicial lobbying campaigns by grouping lobbying
efforts into three categories: Article III issues, judicial administration
issues, and general policy issues.
Article III issues include one of two types of legislative proposals
based on Congress's constitutionally-provided powers: attempts to
establish "inferior [c]ourts" or attempts to alter the judicial branch's
jurisdiction over certain "cases" or "controversies." 2 2 For instance,
congressional debate about splitting established federal judicial circuits
has attracted spirited debate from judges.1 23 Similarly, congressional
debate about the creation of new courts, such as the bankruptcy courts,
has met fierce criticism from judicial officers.1 24 Judges have also
attempted to restrict the types of decision-makers protected by Article
III's safeguards.1 2 5 Congressional attempts to limit federal court
jurisdiction have also been subject to intense lobbying from judges.1 2 6
But judicial lobbying has not been limited to constitutional questions
or debates about the nature of judging. Much judicial lobbying effort has
been focused on matters of judicial administration-the day to day
management of federal cases.1 2 7 Federal judges have not shied away
from opining on the need for increased administrative assistance in the
119. Id.
120. See Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1389 (2008) (promoting state sentencing
reform).
121. See infra section II.C.
122. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1.
123. See, e.g., BARROW & WALKER, supra note 51 at 153-83 (detailing the politics that
ultimately led to the splitting of the Fifth Circuit).
124. See Eric A. Posner, The PoliticalEconomy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 47, 88-99 (1997) (detailing the judicial role in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
125. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article

III, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924, 995 (2000) ("As a lobbying organization, the federal judiciary has
chosen to oppose creation of new federal rights, to support retrenchment of the roles of life-tenured
judges, and to propose delegation of many of their tasks to other judges.").
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 164-67 (describing judicial officers' attempts to influence
the legislative branch).
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judicial process.128 They have lobbied for increased roles for magistrate
judges, bankruptcy judges, and other non-Article III decision-makers.1 29
Federal judges have also been involved in sustained, organized
campaigns for increased judicial salaries.o
The third category ofjudicial lobbying is the most intriguing, yet least
studied. Despite the norms against judicial lobbying on policy matters,
federal judges have repeatedly lobbied Congress on legislative matters
with little direct impact on the judicial branch.131 The range of issues on
which judges have lobbied is vast: from patent law to criminal
benefits
to governmental
from
unemployment
sentencing,
wiretapping.132 Judicial lobbying on policy matters is the most
problematic sort of lobbying from an ethical standpoint. Although
currently permitted by the Judicial Code of Conduct, lobbying the
legislature outside of the formal dialogue spaces of cases and statutes
may expose judges to accusations of bias and partisanship. By weighing
in on controversial policies, judges sacrifice the veneer of impartiality
that sustains confidence in the justice system. 133 Thus, it is logical to ask
why judicial lobbying in policy matters is so prevalent. Why would
judges potentially undermine the legitimacy of their office by engaging
in public lobbying efforts? After describing the history of judicial
lobbying, this Part offers some potential answers to that question.
A.

JudicialLobbying, Historically

There is a long history of judges engaging with legislators. 13 4 Since
the United States was founded, judges, particularly Supreme Court
Justices, have played an active role in crafting and advising on
legislation that directly impacts the judicial branch. 135 Over the first
12 8. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., SMiTH, supra note 42, at 62-64 (summarizing the history of judicial lobbying
about judicial salaries).
131. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 1069-76 (detailing judicial lobbying efforts in the
patent field).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Kevin D. Swan, Comment, Protecting the Appearance of JudicialImpartiality in

the Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 814-15 (1987) (stating
that public support ofjudicial decisions requires the appearance of impartiality).
134. Early Supreme Court Justices traveled widely and interacted with state legislatures thru the
grand jury process. For more on the early process of grand jury instructions, see Helene E.
Schwartz, Demythologizing the HistoricRole of the GrandJury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 750-55
(1972).
135. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1741-53 (discussing the role of early Supreme Court Justices
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century of this nation's history, the judiciary's interactions with statutory
reform were largely ad hoc, however. Neal Katyal, a scholar of the early
American experience with judicial speech, finds that "[t]hroughout the
first decades of the Republic, judges, acting in their individual
capacities, provided Congress with advice about legislative matters."
Katyal notes that courts have advised legislators by "private letter" and
"back-room discussion," among other methods.' Charles Geyh has
described the period from 1789-1922 as one of "unstructured
interaction" between Congress and the courts.1 3 8 Peter Fish has
chronicled numerous examples ofjudges engaged in the legislative work
of testifying about, drafting, and publically supporting court-related
legislation in the nineteenth century. 139 Indeed, while Congress was
debating amendments to the 1789 Judiciary Act, two United States
Supreme Court Justices authored an alternative bill for Congress's
consideration. 140
The historical record of judges attempting to influence congressional
decisions is not limited to the early days of the Republic. Chief Justice
Taft successfully fought against the Caraway Bill which would have
prevented federal judges from commenting to jurors about a witness'
credibility.141 Similarly, Chief Justice Hughes sent a letter to a prominent
senator opposing, and ultimately helping to defeat, President Roosevelt's
court-packing plan.1 42 In short, despite the generally-accepted norms
against extra-judicial advice-giving, judges have, periodically, openly
lobbied Congress.
One of the greatest Supreme Court lobbyists, Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, successfully lobbied Congress to create what would
become the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922.143 This
effort would move judicial lobbying out of the era of backroom
in advising the president and Congress).
136. Id. at 1741.
137. Id. at 1742-43.
138. Geyh, supranote 10, at 1171-72.
139. PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 11, 14-17 (1973)

(describing judicial lobbying efforts on judicial-reform legislation).
140. Katyal, supranote 10, at 1741.
141. MURPHY, supra note 10.

142. Katyal, supranote 10, at 1751-52.
143. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994)); see FISH, supra note 139, at 30-32 (describing Chief Justice Taft's role in the
legislative effort); Geyh, supra note 10, at 1172 (same). The Judicial Conference was originally
named the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. Its name was changed in 1948. See Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 636, § 331, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)).
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individual conversations and into a more open era. The Judicial
Conference serves as the governing body of the federal judiciary and is
headed by the Chief Justice. Since 1939, the Judicial Conference has
been supported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
("AO").'" The AO assists the Judicial Conference in drafting
legislation. The AO staff also monitors judicially-focused legislative
activity on Capitol Hill and frequently testifies before congressional
committees.1 4 5 In 1967, in response to a suggestion from the Judicial
Conference, Congress created the Federal Judicial Center to provide
judicial education and to improve the judiciary's research capabilities.1 4 6
All of these newly-formed organizations created a formalized
structure for direct judicial lobbying of Congress. The Judicial
Conference sends annual reports to Congress. 14 7 Those reports have,
since the inception of the Judicial Conference, included
recommendations for legislation.1 4 8 In addition, the AO submits annual
reports to Congress concerning the workload of the courts. 149 But the
AO and the Judicial Conference also serve as conduits for interbranch
communications between Congress and the courts. Congress regularly
asks the director of the AO to testify concerning legislative proposals
and the impact those proposals might have on judicial case
management.' 5 0 Furthermore, Congress often asks for specific input on
legislation from the Judicial Center.is5
144. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1175.
145. Id. In 1991, the Judicial Conference created the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment
(OJIA) within the AO to evaluate the potential impact on the judiciary of proposed legislation.
146. See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration:
Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1988) (describing the
creation of the FJC).
147. See Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:The ChiefJustice, the
Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 42-45 (1985)

(questioning the role played by the Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference in the bankruptcy
amendments of 1984).
148. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1173 & n.27 (noting policy recommendations of the Judicial
Conference); see also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedingsjudicial-conference-us [https://perma.cc/3TPW-TW74] [hereinafter 2015 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT].

149. Administrative Office Act of 1939,
U.S.C. § 332 (1994)).

§ 305,

53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (codified as amended at 28

150. See, e.g., MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 25 (2009) ("[Jludges often allow the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts ... to speak for them on legislative matters.").
151. Id. ("[T]he Judicial Conference will sometimes seek invitations to comment on legislative
proposals.").

424

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:401

But the creation of more formalized judicial lobbying organizations
has left some dissatisfied. Scholars have disputed whether the courts
should engage as thoroughly with Congress as they have in the past.12
Despite the historical precedent for judicial involvement with legislation,
Katyal is not persuaded that history is the best normative guide.' 53 For
him, "[e]xtrajudicial advice raises troublesome issues about judicial
propriety and smoky, back-room deals."l54 But Katyal argues that judges
do have a role to play as "advicegivers" in the legislative process.15 5 He
advocates for "advicegiving via written opinions in cases and
controversies," not in extra-judicial forums.1 56 Thus, he is not arguing in
favor ofjudicial lobbying as defined in this Article.
B.

Modern JudicialLobbying

Despite the presence of an organized administrative complex for
judicial lobbying centered at the Judicial Center, ad hoc judicial
lobbying continues to this day. Yet some common concerns about
judicial lobbying should be noted. First, widespread judicial lobbying
threatens the legitimacy of the judiciary. If judges are perceived as
biased decision-makers, the judiciary sits on precarious ground with both
the public and the other branches of government.' 57 No other branch
depends so heavily on the perception of impartiality in its actions.'
Second, judges are discouraged from lobbying on general legal
matters because such lobbying might be seen as unfair to litigants.1 59 If a
judge is asked to review the legality of a statute for which the judge has
previously lobbied, it is reasonable to think that such action might
influence a future decision. Litigants would likely feel that such a judge
would not be able to give a fair decision about the statute's validity.

152. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1752 (claiming that past judicial precedent does not provide
cover for judicial advicegiving).
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., James M. Scheppele, Are We Turning Judges Into Politicians?, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1517, 1521 (2005) ("As both a coequal branch of government and an impartial arbiter of
disputes, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to solicit money.").
158. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315, 315 (1999) ("Concern about judicial independence has been a recurrent feature of
American history. . . .").
159. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 373-79 (2009) (describing the right to an "unbiased judiciary").
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Consider the case of Williams-Yulee v. FloridaBar,1 6 0 which dealt with
whether judges could solicit money for their election.161 In finding that
such solicitation was forbidden, the Supreme Court recognized "a
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their
judiciaries."162 Judicial lobbying makes judges look more like politicians
and less like neutral arbiters.
A third concern about judicial lobbying involves the value of such
lobbying. While federal judges are well-educated and qualified
individuals, there is little reason to think that judges are experts on most
policy questions.163 Thus, we may not want judges lobbying because
they are not very good at selecting a policy position that benefits the
public. The value of judicial input in the legislative process is likely to
be outweighed by the potential downsides of judicial lobbying.
Lastly, judicial lobbying risks alienating congressmen who may,
rightly or wrongly, view such actions as a breach of the separation of
powers. 1 " There is always some risk that any judicial action will anger
some faction of Congress, but judicial lobbying efforts seem to be
extremely troubling to various congressmen. 165 Each branch of
government desires to maintain its particular sphere of influence and
judicial lobbying may be threatening to the legislative branch.
This section attempts to make sense of those continued efforts by
examining the circumstances in which they occur. It focuses on three
types of lobbying efforts: Article III issues (creation of new courts and
judges, for example); judicial administration issues (issues that directly
impact the judiciary, but which do not implicate constitutional
concerns); and policy issues (issues that have little or no connection to
the functioning of the court).

160. _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
161. See id Williams-Yulee dealt with campaign contributions for elected state officials, but the
issue of judicial integrity applies with equal force to federal judges.
162. Id. at 1673.
163. See Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise ofJudges in EvaluatingEvidence, 156

U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 6-7 (2007) ("There is no good reason to conclude that, by virtue
of qualities, training, or experience, trial judges should be considered experts at weighting evidence
or at fact-finding"); but see Robin Jacob, Knowledge of the World and the Act of Judging, 2
OSGOODE HALL REv. L. & POL'Y 22, 22-28 (2014) (arguing that knowledge of general matters is
essential to good judging, or at least the perception of good judging).
164. See John Conyers, Conyers: Patent System Needs Updating, ROLL CALL (June 8, 2010),
http://www.rollcall.com/features/TechnologyTelecommunications/tandt/-48169-1.html
[https://perna.cc/T3QW-HM57] ("Congress, not the courts, must clarify and update patent law.").

165. See id.; Winkle
of the court.").

III, supra note 40,

at 265 ("Lobbying ...

may . .. compromise the integrity
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The Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and
"such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."1 66 Judges have been very active in lobbying for and against
Congress's creation of such courts. From an informational perspective, it
makes sense that the legislative process required to create new courts
would include judicial involvement: judges are experts at judging, and
can inform lawmakers about optimal arrangements of judges.
Within the past forty years, Congress has seriously considered
splitting two federal judicial circuits: the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits. In
the 1960s, the increasing number of civil rights cases being filed in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals-which covered the states of Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia-threatened to
overwhelm the circuit's judges.1 6 7 In response, Chief Justice Warren
authorized a special committee to make recommendations about the
workload of the Fifth Circuit.' 6 8 The resulting Biggs committee advised
that the Fifth Circuit needed fifteen judges to efficiently handle its
caseload: six more than were currently on the court.' 69 Thus, the
committee recommended splitting the circuit into two, dividing the
circuit along the Mississippi River.' 70 Such a division entailed serious
political consequences, however. Separating the judges based in Texas
and Louisiana from the rest of the circuit would effectively dilute the
influence of the four liberal judges on the court.' 7 ' Some of those liberal
judges campaigned publicly against the division, arguing that it would
undermine civil rights gains in the South. 172 Despite the warnings of the
Biggs committee, political opposition to any circuit division had
effectively killed all proposals by 1964.173
Instead of splitting the circuit, Congress authorized new judgeships
for the Fifth Circuit. By 1978, the court had swelled to twenty-six

166. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
167. BARRow & WALKER, supra note 51, at 64.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id at 8.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Each newly created circuit would have contained only two liberal judges. Id.
Id. at 65, 88.
Id. at 63-68, 121.
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judges.1 74 In response, all of the judges on the circuit wrote a letter to
Congress urging division.175 Political concerns remained, however, and
the judges were forced to take on even more active roles in the
legislative process. Thus, they encouraged civil rights activists to join
their lobbying efforts.1 76 They also encouraged judges who were racial
minorities to voice their approval to members of Congress. 7 7
Furthermore, they alleviated political concerns by proposing to include
Mississippi in the reformed Fifth Circuit."' Finally, in October 1980 the
judges' efforts proved successful when Congress divided the circuit and
created the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 9
Similar proposals to split the Ninth Circuit have encountered
resistance from that circuit's judges. The Ninth Circuit is the largest,
most congested circuit court in the country, covering the states of
California, Hawaii, Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, and Nevada as well as the territories of Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands. Its twenty-eight active judges dwarf all other
circuit courts, the second largest of which has seventeen judgeships.180
The court's size and massive caseload has led to delays in
adjudication,'' the abandonment of en banc review in favor of the
problematic "limited en banc" review,182 and a notoriously high reversal
rate at the Supreme Court.1 8 3 Various legislative proposals have been put
174. Id. at 1, 64.
175. Id. at 236.
176. Id. at 237-38.
177. Id
178. Id.
179. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)).
180. Legislative Proposals to Split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of
Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att'y Gen. for Legal Policy).
181. Examining the Proposalto Restructure the Ninth Circuit: Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S.

Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Diarmuid O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) ("The Ninth Circuit's enormous size ... creates
problems for our litigants. In my court, the median time from when a party activates an appeal to
when it receives resolution is over 15 months-four months longer than the average for the rest of

the Courts of Appeals.").
182. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 ("[A limited en banc hearing] shall consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit
and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the Court. In the absence of
the Chief Judge, an 11th active judge shall be drawn by lot, and the most senior active judge on the
panel shall preside."). Such limited en banc review has been criticized. See Peter S. Menell & Ryan
Vacca, Reconsidering En Banc Review: A Circuit Stewardship Theory (work in progress) (on file
with author).
183. Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 341, 345
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forward that would split the circuit into two (or in one case, three)
circuits.18 4

Despite the size of the circuit, as of 2005 only three judges on the
circuit favored any of the various legislative proposals designed to split
the court.' 8 5 In fact, many of the judges on the circuit have publicly
lobbied for the Ninth Circuit to remain in its present state. As was the
case in the debate surrounding proposals to split the Fifth Circuit, much
of the debate about how to divide the Ninth Circuit has centered on
politics. The Ninth Circuit is one of the most reliably liberal circuits in
the country, despite presiding over some of the most conservativeleaning states in the union (e.g., Arizona, Idaho, Montana).' 86 Ninth
Circuit judges have nearly unanimously lobbied against splitting their
circuit. 187 In part due to deference to those judges' views, Congress has
yet to act and legislation splitting the Ninth Circuit appears unlikely to
pass in the near term.1 8

(2006) ("[O]ver the past twenty-one Supreme Court terms (since the Fifth Circuit was split), the
Ninth Circuit has been reversed an average of 14.48 times, with the next closest circuit (the 'new'
Fifth) reversed 5.14 times per term over the same time period.").
184. See Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 525, 110th
Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two with California, Guam, Hawaii, and the
Northern Mariana Islands remaining in the Ninth); Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and
Modernization Act of 2005, S. 1845, 109th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two,
with California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands remaining in the Ninth Circuit);
Ninth Circuit Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2005, H.R. 211, 109th Cong. (proposing
splitting the Ninth Circuit in three, with California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands in the Ninth, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana in the Twelfth, and Alaska, Oregon, and
Washington in the Thirteenth); Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of
2003, H.R. 2723, 108th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, with Arizona,
California and Nevada remaining in the Ninth Circuit); Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 2003, S. 562, 108th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two,
with California and Nevada remaining in the Ninth Circuit and all other jurisdictions being assigned
to a new Twelfth Circuit).
185. Revisiting Proposals to Split the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Solution to a Growing
Problem: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit) [hereinafter Kozinski].
186. Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and
the Congress, 77 OR. L. REv. 405, 408 (1998) ("One reads about a court that is 'big, feisty and
liberal,' a 'renegade court' that includes 'one of the last unabashed liberals,' and many 'colorful'
judges.

); see also Matt Ford, Arizona v. Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.

4, 2016) (highlighting proposals from Arizona politicians to split the Ninth Circuit).
187. See Kozinski, supranote 185.
188. See Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, but Not Imminent, 56 OHIo
ST. L. REv. 947, 950 (1995) (urging Congress to take it slow in dividing the Ninth Circuit).
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DefiningArticle III "Judge"

Another area of proposed legislation that has attracted the attention of
the judiciary involves bills that would increase the number of Article M
judges. For instance, in 1973 after several years of study, the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed
legislation to Congress that would have created fifteen-year terms for
bankruptcy judges.1 89 Unhappy with the proposal, the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted a separate bill that would have
conferred Article III status on bankruptcy judges. 190 Elevating
bankruptcy judges to Article 111 judges would have granted those judges
life tenure, among the other benefits that accompany Article III status.
Prior to the National Conference's proposal, the Judicial Conference
of the United States had largely been silent on bankruptcy reform. 1 91
However, once the House produced a legislative proposal that would
have conferred life tenure on bankruptcy judges, the Judicial Conference
undertook lobbying efforts to keep bankruptcy judges as Article I
judges. 192 Chief Justice Burger was heavily involved in the lobbying
efforts coordinated by the Judicial Conference. He made numerous
phone calls to key senators and congressmen as well as Attorney
General Griffin Bell in an effort to limit the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction and tenure. 19 3 Those lobbying efforts ultimately proved
successful as Congress passed bankruptcy reform bills that established
bankruptcy courts in every jurisdiction, but designated bankruptcy
judges as Article I judges who serve fourteen-year terms. 194
Judith Resnik has summarized the organized lobbying by the Judicial
Conference as "a lobby against federal jurisdiction."1 9 5 To her, the
lobbying efforts of the Judicial Conference have coalesced around
keeping cases out of federal court, keeping Article III judges separate
from non-tenured "federal" judges, and reducing litigants' rights. 196 This
less-than-flattering take on judicial lobbying deftly explains the efforts
of the judicial conference during the period of bankruptcy reform.
189. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the

Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 341 (2007).
190. Id. at 341-42.
191. Id. at 342.
192.
193.
194.
U.S.C.
195.
196.

Id. at 365-70.
Id.
Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-361, 106 Stat. 965 (codified at 28
§ 152 (2012)).
Resnik, supranote 125, at 930.
See id. at 929-30.
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JudicialAdministration

Federal judges have also actively lobbied for statutory improvements
related to the administrative aspects of judging. While the Constitution
guarantees judicial salaries will not be reduced, it provides no guidance
on what salaries are appropriate and when they should be raised: "The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts ...

shall, at stated

Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office."l9 7 Thus, during various
periods of U.S. history, judges have lobbied Congress to increase
judicial salaries.'"
At times, this lobbying for increased salaries has occurred through the
official channels of the Judicial Conference.1 99 At other times, however,
it has taken a more ad hoc approach. For instance, Chief Justice
Rehnquist conducted a press conference and called judicial salaries the
most pressing issue facing the legal system.2 00 His successor, Chief
Justice Roberts, characterized the judicial pay issue as a "constitutional
crisis" in his 2006 annual report to Congress.20 ' Ultimately, the issue
was decided by the courts, not the legislature. In 2012, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Beer v. United States,202 in
which six federal judges challenged the constitutionality of Congress's
repeated decisions to deny promised cost-of-living to federal judges over
a fifteen-year period.203 The court held that Congress had impermissibly
withheld judicial pay.2 0
When it comes to judicial salaries, judges have also looked to
organizations beyond the Judicial Conference for lobbying assistance. In
1981, a group of several hundred federal judges formed the Federal

197. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
198. See 2015 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 16-17 ("The Judicial

Conference adopted a number of legislative positions over the last two decades to address a crisis in
judicial compensation resulting from the denial to federal judges of many annual pay adjustments
under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.").
199. See SrfH, supra note 27, at 45-46 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist's public lobbying for salary
increases [for judges] was unanimously supported by the Judicial Conference of the United
States . . . ").
200. See Smith, supranote 10, at 45 (recalling Rehnquist's news conference).
201. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1-8

(Jan.
1,
2007),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RP3L-NUSM].
202. 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
203. See id.
204. Id.
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Judges Association (FJA). 2 05 The FJA is a private organization dedicated
to lobbying Congress on behalf ofjudicial compensation issues-such as
salary and benefits-as well as on judicial administration issues. 20 6 The
creation of the FJA unnerved many congresspersons, who asked the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the propriety of
private judicial lobbying.207 The GAO found, among other things, that,
as "a private, voluntary membership organization with no official
connection to the federal government," anti-lobbying restrictions would
not apply to activities of the FJA.20 8
More recently, the chief judges from eighty-seven of the ninety-four
federal district courts signed a letter to Congress detailing the impact
that sequestration of funds was having on the judiciary. 209 The letter
expressed concern about the ability of courts to continue to dispense
timely justice, to continue funding public defenders, and to maintain
safety and security in federal courthouses.2 10 While the letter appeared to
be an ad hoc movement by the district courts, it may have been
coordinated with the Judicial Center, which followed up with a similar
request shortly thereafter.2 11
3.

Policy Issues

The most common (not to mention intriguing) area of judicial
lobbying efforts concerns matters of general policy. Justice, it is thought,
is best served by having judicial officers avoid extrajudicial speech
concerning matters of general policy and statutory reform.212 Despite
205. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS

160-61 (1988) (describing the creation of the Federal Judges Association).
206. Id.
207. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-129874, REQUEST FOR GAO
DETERMINATION CONCERNING JUDICIARY'S USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS To LOBBY CONGRESS (1984).

208. Id.
209. Letter from Loretta A. Preska, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to
Joseph R. Biden, President, U.S. Senate (Aug. 13, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/Chief-Judges-Letter-to-Joseph-Biden.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KA7-ZD4Q].
210. Id.
211. Letter from John D. Bates, Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Barack Obama,
President, United States (Sept. 10, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/defaultfiles/LetterPresident-FY14-FundingO.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDT2-7S9G]; see also CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
ROBERTS,

2010

YEAR-END

REPORT

ON

THE

FEDERAL

JUDICIARY

(Dec.

31,

2010),

http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/56EMKDFH] (calling "budgetary constraints" one of two obstacles that impedes the courts from
achieving their goals).
212. See Winkle III, supra note 40, at 265 (stating that lobbying is contrary to the public image of
a judge).
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this concern, judges have, from time to time, been active lobbyists on
general policy. This section will detail some recent instances of such
lobbying in the areas of patent law, surveillance law, bankruptcy law,
and military law.
a.

PatentLaw

Patent law has experienced extensive judicial lobbying, mostly from
judges on the specialized appellate court that handles patent appeals.213
In the late-1970s, Congress began considering the creation of specialized
courts to handle patent cases.214 As a result, Congress created the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.215 Since its creation,
the judges of the Federal Circuit have been active in legislative affairs. 216
During the four-year debate about patent reform between 2004 and 2008
(culminating in the passage of the America Invents Act2 17 ), the court
made numerous attempts to influence the shape of the ultimate
legislation.
On May 3, 2007, while the Patent Reform Acts of 2007218 were
213. For more on the appeal of lobbying in the patent space, see Robert P. Merges, The Trouble
with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1607-14

(proposing a greater delineation of "patent trolls" by both the courts and Congress).
214. A number of existing, specialized courts were combined to create the Federal Circuit. U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990, at 1 (1991).

215. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1989) (referring to creation of the Federal Circuit as "a sustained experiment
in specialization"); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing GuardofPatentLaw: Chevron Deference

for the PTO, 54 WILL. & MARY L. REv 1959, 2001-05 (2013) (rejecting two arguments for denying
the PTO Chevron deference based on the Federal Circuit's creation).
216. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the last three Chief Judges of the court have extensive legislative
experience. Chief Judge Michel was chief counsel for Senator Arlen Specter. See Kristina Peterson,

Retiring Chief Federal Patent Judge May Start Think Tank, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125934593867466659 [http://perma.cc/8U2C-3JRB]. Chief Judge
Rader served as legislative director of the House Ways and Means Committee before serving as
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1980-1988. He has also served as counsel for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. See Tony Dutra, Judge Randall Rader Will
Step Down as Federal Circuit Chief Effective May 30, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 29, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/judge-randall-rader-nl7179890796/ [https://perma.cc/PN6Y-JW3W]. Judge
Prost served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee immediately before her elevation
to the bench, and prior to that served as the Chief Counsel for the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources. Ryan Davis, New FederalCircuit ChiefHas Deep Patent Background, LAW360
(May 28, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/542118/new-fed-circ-chief-has-deep-patentbackground [https://perma.cc/5ZDE-CT66].
217. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(o), 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)).
218. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
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pending before House and Senate committees, the Federal Circuit's
Chief Judge Michel sent a letter to Senators Leahy and Hatch.2 19 In that
letter, Chief Judge Michel expressed his opposition towards two aspects
of the proposed legislation.220 Specifically, Chief Judge Michel argued
that the provisions on damage apportionment and claim construction
interlocutory appeals were unnecessary and incapable of being
implemented by the courts. 2 2 1 As for damages, he argued that judges
were not economic experts and would have difficulty making fine
economic decisions. 2 22 Making such damage determinations, he claimed,
would inundate courts with extra work and invite battles between
competing experts.2 23
Regarding claim construction, Chief Judge Michel argued that many
claim construction decisions quickly led to summary judgment and
therefore were not in need of interlocutory review.224 Requiring
interlocutory review, he argued, would simply prolong patent
disputes. 2 25 "[T]he courts as presently constituted," Chief Judge Michel
wrote, "simply cannot implement the provisions in a careful and timely
manner." 226
Just one month later, Chief Judge Michel sent another letter to Shanna
Winters, Chief Counsel to the House Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property.227 In this letter, Chief Judge Michel
argued that damages law was "highly stable and well understood by
litigators as well as judges." 22 8 He suggested that Congress should "do
nothing" concerning damages.229
219. See Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to
Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 3, 2007),
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments/patentdamages/05-03-07Michelletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6VL-UJ5X] (questioning whether these provisions, "if enacted, . . . could be
effectively and efficiently administered by the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit").
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1.
225. See id at 1-2 (indicating that "[t]he new provision could double" already long delays in
patent cases).

226. Id. at 2.
227. Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to
Shanna A. Winters, Chief Counsel, House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual
Property (June 7, 2007), http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/98
/2007/06/Michel-letter-to-Winters.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVH7-GQBH].
228. Id. at 1.
229. Id.
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Chief Judge Michel's lobbying effort against patent reform was not
limited to a senatorial letter-writing campaign. Chief Judge Michel also
gave speeches to practicing attorneys in which he suggested that the
proposed changes to damages and claim construction would adversely
impact the work of the courts. 23 0 Chief Judge Michel repeatedly urged IP
litigators and patent holders to lobby Congress to remove the damages
and claim construction portions of the bill.23 1 Further, he wrote various
op-eds suggesting that Congress need not interfere in patent litigation
reform. 23 2
Chief Judge Michel's lobbying efforts urging legislative inaction on
damages and claim construction received mixed results. His suggestion
to do nothing on damage reform was initially ignored by Congress, as
Congress made changes to the damage portions of the bills despite Chief
Judge Michel's criticisms.23 3 Ultimately, however, both claim
construction and damages reform were dropped from the final bill.2 34
Chief Judge Michel's predecessor, Chief Judge Rader, has also been
eager to express his views on patent reform. He has written op-eds
expressing the lack of need for congressional action in the area of fee
shifting, a subject that Congress continues to debate.23 5 Chief Judge
Rader, even more so than Chief Judge Michel, has been quite vocal
about the role that Congress and even the Supreme Court should play in
setting patent policy, urging both institutions to let his court take the lead
in patent reform.
It is not surprising that the Federal Circuit is interested in patent
reform legislation. While the court hears other types of cases, it is best
230. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Address Before the
Association
of
Corporate
Patent
Counsel
(Jan.
28,
2008),
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2008/02/transcriptnmichel.pdf [https://perma.cc/FML7-UU6E].
231. See id at 13 (urging attendees "to assure that whatever the Congress [does] ... reflects the
best input . . .from all of the best minds" after repeatedly critiquing the damages and interlocutory
review provisions of draft legislation and suggesting that Congress is overburdened with other
issues).
232. See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Q&A: Judge Michel on Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27,
2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/11/27/qa-judge-michel-on-patent-law/ [https://perma.cc/
P8Q8-7VFQ] (arguing that "the management of ongoing litigation [including damages is] inherently
judicial" in nature).
233 H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (demonstrating modifications to damages in both House
and Senate versions of reform despite Chief Judge Michel's warning).
234. See Sean B. Seymore, Foresight Bias in PatentLaw, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 110506 (2015) (stating that much "attention in the patent reform debate has focused on the substantive
standards for patentability," which do not include claim construction or damages).
235. Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25
(arguing that congressional proposals on fee shifting in patent cases are unnecessary because judges
"already have the authority to curtail" trolls by making them "pay for abusive litigation").
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known for and spends most of its time deciding patent appeals.2 3 6
Substantial changes to the patent act-like those of the America Invents
Act-have the potential to substantially change the day-to-day workings
of the court. What is perhaps surprising is the way in which the Federal
Circuit has approached legislative reform of the patent statute. Instead of
passively waiting for the results of the legislative process, the court
(through the chief judge) has actively lobbied Congress, usually urging
Congress to do nothing and to leave the messy job of legal reform to the
court.
b.

SurveillanceLaw

On January 10, 2014, Judge Bates, Chief Judge of the FISA Court,
sent the first of a series of letters to members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee expressing his views on the merits of proposed reforms of
the U.S. surveillance program.2 37 Judge Bates viewed the Senate's
proposed USA Freedom Act as unduly burdensome for his court to
implement. He suggested that the proposed inclusion of a special
advocate in FISA Court proceedings was "potentially inconsistent with
the requirements of Article III.",238 In his last letter, Judge Bates
proposed specific changes to the bill. He suggested that the court should
have discretion in appointing privacy advocates, because the court often
hears simple cases in which an advocate would be unnecessary. 239 He
also suggested that publically releasing FISA Court opinions would be
unhelpful. 240
In the first of his letters, Judge Bates indicated that his opposition to
the USA Freedom Act represented that of the "Judiciary." 2 4 1 This claim
is likely to have carried weight with Congress because at the time of his
236. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, YEAR-TO-DATE ACTIVITY, AS OF
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the2015
(2015),
FEBRUARY
28,

court/statistics/ytdactivityfebruary_2015.pdf[https://perma.cc/DB2R-EXTK]
date caseloads).

(tallying year-to-

237. JOHN D. BATES, COMMENTS OF THE JUDICIARY ON PROPOSALS REGARDING THE FOREIGN
(2014),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpACT
SURVEILLANCE
INTELLIGENCE

content/uploads/2014/01/1-10-2014-Enclosure-re-FISA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4T4-8DW5]; Letter
from John D. Bates, Director, Admin. Offices of the U.S. Courts, to Dianne Feinstein, Chairman,
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp[https://perma.cc/2R5Ycontent/uploads/2014/01/1-13-2014-Ltr-to-DFeinstein-re-FISA.pdf
RMVG]; USA FREEDOM ACT, H.R. REP. No. 113-452, pt. 2 (2014).
238.
239.
240.
241.

Letter from John D. Bates to Patrick J. Leahy, supranote 3, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Letter from John D. Bates to Dianne Feinstein, supra note 237, at 1.
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letters, Judge Bates also served as the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.242 Judge Bates's subsequent letters
explained that the Judicial Conference was not consulted on his
stance.243 He continued, however, to refer to his views as those of the
Judiciary. 24
Judge Bates's actions have come under criticism from legal
scholarS 245 and legal reporters.246 They have also been questioned by
other judges. In an August 2014 letter, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski stated that the Judicial Conference had not considered the
matters addressed by Judge Bates and therefore did not endorse his
comments.24 7
But Judge Bates is not the only judge to have publically taken a
position on government surveillance. Indeed, two other judges on his
court, Judges Carr and Robertson, have opined on their views of the
proper role of surveillance by the government. Both judges have taken
positions contrary to those of Judge Bates. After stepping down from the
court, Judge Robertson (who remained a district court judge in the
district of the District of Columbia) called for greater transparency in the
court's proceedings and an advocate to argue against the government,
much like that found in the proposed USA FREEDOM Act.248 Judge
Carr went even further, outlining in an op-ed in the New York Times a
proposal to have court-appointed lawyers assist the court with novel
legal questions.249
The lobbying efforts of the judges on the FISA Court provide an
interesting insight into the motives behind judicial lobbying efforts. All
of the judges on the FISA Court are federal judges, usually (but not
always) generalist judges from geographic district courts before their

242. See Michael Lipkin, Former FISA Court Judge Cautions Against Some Reforms, LAW360
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/501238/former-fisa-court-judge-cautions-againstsome-reforms [https://perma.cc/RT68-XMAP].
243. Letter from John D. Bates to Patrick J. Leahy, supranote 3, at 6.
244. Id.
245. Vladeck, supranote 7.
246. Siobhan Gorman, US. Judge Blasts Bill to Revamp Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/usjudgeblastsbilltorevampsurveillancel407367365
[https://perma.cc/A6LW-Z6NQ].
247. Letter from Alex Kozinski to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 6.
248. Pema Levy, Former FISA Court Judge: Secret CourtNeeds Reform, INT'L Bus. TIMES (July

9, 2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/former-fisa-court-judge-secret-court-needs-reform-1338671
[https://perma.cc/TMC8-5RUN].
249. James G. Carr, Opinion, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013, at A21.
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temporary appointment to FISA Court.250 Such generalist district court
judges rarely lobby Congress, in fact, as far as I can tell, Judges Bates,
Robinson, and Carr have not publically advocated for policy positions
when serving as district court judges. But once on the FISA Court, all
three judges have felt compelled to interact with Congress on pending
legislation.
c.

Bankruptcy Law

When the House was considering the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2003,25 1 Fifth Circuit Judge Edith
Jones, who was a former member of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, wrote a letter to the chairman of the House Committee on
the Judiciary.25 2 In the letter, she explained that she supported the bill,
but wanted Congress to get rid of Section 414, which would have altered
the "disinterested person" standard for bankruptcy professionals. 25 3 In
Judge Jones' view, the disinterested person standard protected the
integrity of the bankruptcy process and avoided conflicting loyalties
between bankruptcy professionals, debtors, and creditors. 2 54 Jones' letter
was cited by both Congressman Bachus and Congressman Nadler during
floor debates on January 28, 2004.255 The letter was again cited in 2005
in the Senate by Senator Leahy and Senator Sarbanes.256
Jones has also advocated for bankruptcy reform via legal publications.
In 1999 she published a law review article urging Congress to adopt
means testing as a gatekeeping rule before consumers could file for
257
tetm
bankruptcy.
At the time of the article, means testing was a hotly
contested congressional issue.258 It ultimately became part of the law in

250. See Current Membership - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership

[https://perma.cc/HK3H-V6QL].
25 1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 150 CONG. REc. 148,

150 (2004).
252. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron and the New Disinterestedness-TheFoxes are Guarding the

Henhouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 521, 525-26 (2005) (quoting from Judge Jones' letter).
2 5 3. Id.
254. See id
255. See 150 CONG. REC. H150-51 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Bachus); id. at
H219 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
256. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REC. 2306
(2005).
257. Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177,
179-81 (1999).
258. Id. at 178 ("The most contentious reform that has been suggested ... has been the
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2005
Bankruptcy cases are heard before specialized federal bankruptcy
judges. 25 9 Bankruptcy judges have also frequently engaged with
Congress on bankruptcy reform, but usually only upon the request of
Congress to do so. 2 60 Judge Jones's interest in reform may be personalbefore her appointment to the bench, she was in private practice
specializing in bankruptcy cases.
d.

Military Law

Judges from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have been
relatively restrained in their lobbying efforts. The one notable exception
concerns the United States' implementation of the Geneva
Convention. 2 61 The United States ratified the Geneva Convention in
1955, but in 1996 had yet to implement the treaty through legislation.
The aim of House Bill 2587 in 1996 was to remedy this lack of
implementation by establishing penalties for certain war crimes,
including murder and torture against members of the U.S. armed forces
or U.S. nationals.262 H.R. 2587 would have added a provision to the U.S.
Code providing that
whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions where the victim of
such breach is a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States or a citizen of the United States shall be fined or
imprisoned or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also
be subject to the penalty of death. 263
Judge R.O. Everett of the CAAF expressed his support for the
proposal, but was of the opinion that Congress should go further. Everett
believed that Congress should make clear that the provision should leave
jurisdiction for prosecuting violators with military tribunals and not with

imposition of means-testing for upper-income debtors.").
259. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012).
260. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. 2,

97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, at 146 (Oct. 29, 1981) (statement of Judge Lee) (testifying before
Congress about the bankruptcy reforms of 1978).
261. War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and

Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20 (1996) (statement of the Hon. Robinson
0. Everett, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
262. Id. at 1 (statement of the Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims).
263. Id. at 2.
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other federal courts. 2 64 Everett suggested specific language that would
have clarified that the statute was not a repeal of the jurisdiction enjoyed

by courts-martial and military commissions under articles eighteen and
twenty-one of the Uniform Code.265 According to Everett, repeal of the
court's jurisdiction would result in some cases lacking jurisdiction in any
court. 266

Everett also encouraged Congress to expand the reach of the law. He

proposed replacing the word "citizen"

with the more inclusive

"national." 267 He suggested including not only violations of the Geneva
Convention but also violations of several other major treaties entered
into by the United States, including the Hague Convention and various
treaties concerned with land mines. In addition, he argued for the
creation of universal jurisdiction:
If the heinousness of a crime and its impact on the international
community have been recognized by treaties into which our
countries and many others have entered, American courts should
have jurisdiction over that crime.26 8
Judge Everett also suggested that articles eighteen and twenty-one of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice be amended specifically to
empower courts-martial and military commissions to try anyone accused
of a "grave breach" of any treaty to which H.R. 2587 may refer.26 9
Finally, even though he made clear that he was not opposed to the death
penalty, he explained that as practical matter in the international context,
including potential death penalty cases would "create[] more problems
than it's worth." 2 70
Judge Everett's lobbying efforts are consistent with the lobbying
efforts that have come from other specialized courts: courts seek to
consolidate their power by maintaining or expanding their jurisdiction or
by increasing their influence on the types of reform that are
implemented. In this way, specialized courts resemble executive

264. Id. at 20-21 (statement of J. R. 0. Everett, U.S. Court of Military Appeal for the Armed
Forces).

265. Id. at 20-23.
266. Id at 20-24.
267. Id. at 23.
268. Id
269. See H.R. 3680, 104th Cong. (1996) (making it a federal offense to "commit[] a grave breach
of the Geneva Conventions").
270. War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearingon H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and

Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 261, at 1 (statement of the Honorable Lamar
Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims).
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administrative agencies, which are thought to seek increased
responsibilities as a way of maximizing power and influence."'
C.

Specialization'sImpact on JudicialLobbying

The frequency and depth of lobbying efforts from judges on
specialized courts is worth studying. To be sure, there are examples of
generalist judges lobbying on policy matters. For example, as described
in Section II.B.3.c, Judge Jones (a Fifth Circuit judge) has lobbied
extensively on bankruptcy reform. Prior to joining the bench, Jones was
in private practice and specialized in bankruptcy, but as a judge she
hears a wide range of cases. But the depth of specialized jurist
involvement in legislative affairs is striking. The Federal Circuit's
judges have been, perhaps, the most obvious example of this. Both Chief
Judge Michel and Chief Judge Rader have been extremely vocal in
commenting on proposed legislation that would alter the patent statute.
But specialization's impact on lobbying is perhaps best exemplified
by the lobbying of the FISA Court judges. FISA Court judges have been
extremely active in debating the merits of governmental surveillance.272
Three judges from the court have spoken out strongly on proposed
legislation, with all three judges disagreeing about the best way to
approach the issue.273
As to why specialization leads to lobbying, history might provide a
clue. In 1910, Congress created the Commerce Court of the United
States.2 74 The court was a specialized court with jurisdiction over cases
arising from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.275 The
court, while specialized, did not consist of specialized judges, however.
The judges on the court were appointed for five-year terms, but during
their service on the court, they simultaneously served as at-large circuit
judges, sitting as appointed by the Chief Justice.2 76 Upon the completion
of their terms, they were assigned to one of the circuit courts. 2 77 In this

271. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers

and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 575-84 (1984) (summarizing arguments for
administrative enlargement).
272. See supra section I.B.2.

273. See supra note 1 (listing three letters from Judge Bates urging strengthening the court's
powers); Levy, supra note 248 (recommending modifications to the FISA Court's jurisdiction);
Carr, supra note 249 (proposing drastic changes to the surveillance court).
274. Mann-Elkins Act, 61st Cong., ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (June 18, 1910).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. George E. Dix, The Death ofthe Commerce Court:A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM.
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way, the court is similar to the FISA Court in that the judges come from
non-specialized judicial backgrounds and return to generalist positions at
the end of their terms.
The Commerce Court only remained in existence for three years, so
judges were not offered many opportunities to lobby Congress.27 8
However, Judge Martin Knapp made two statements, both relating to the
Erdman Act, an 1898 law that pertained to railroad disputes and which
provided the bulk of the Commerce Court's cases. Judge Knapp made
suggestions about proposed alterations to the Erdman Act in 1912.279
Judge Knapp suggested three main changes to the act.2 80 First, he
proposed broadening the scope of the law.281 Second, he suggested
simplifying the law by leaving out anything not deemed essential to the
accomplishment of its purpose. 282 This included minor changes of
procedure, designed to give the law greater flexibility, so that it could be
more readily adapted to varying conditions and different controversies.
Lastly, he suggested replacing the court's mediators with a board of
mediation and conciliation so constituted as to be able to meet the
increased demand that would result from the proposed extension of the
law.283 In essence, Knapp proposed increasing the jurisdiction of his
court, simplifying the procedural aspects of the law, and increasing
administrative positions for his court. He made similar proposals the
following year.284 After the termination of the Commerce Court in 1913,
he served on the Fourth Circuit until his death in 1923.285
Thus, the Commerce Court provides a historical example of
specialized adjudication resulting in increased judicial lobbying. Like
other specialized courts, the lobbying efforts from the Commerce Court
were focused on jurisdictional expansion: specialized courts tend to seek
to increase the types of cases that the court hears. Chief Judge Rader of
J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).

278. Id.
279. The Erdman Act: Hearing on H.R. 22012 Before the H Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 62d Cong. 3 (1912) (statement of C.J. Martin A. Knapp, Commerce Court).
280. Id. at 6-21.
281. Id. at 7-10.
282. Id. at 7-13.
283. Id. at 3.
284. Arbitration in ControversiesBetween Employers and Employees: Hearingon S. 2517 Before

the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 63d Cong. 18-31 (1913) (statement of C.J. Martin A. Knapp,
Commerce Court).
285. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Knapp, Martin Augustine, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet

/nGetlnfo?jid=1293&cid-999&ctype-na&instate--na [https://perma.cc/N7J7-7ASK].
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the Federal Circuit has also followed this pattern, repeatedly suggesting
that his court should hear all types of intellectual property disputes, not
just patent cases and scattered trademark cases.286 Section I.B, infra,
begins to explain how specialization incentivizes judicial lobbying.
III.

REGULATING JUDICIAL LOBBYING BY SPECIALIZED
JUDGES

A.

What (IfAnything) Is Wrong with JudicialLobbying?

Although judicial lobbying has its detractors, not all commentators
believe that it is problematic. James Douglas and Roger Hartley have
argued that "courts are acting too conservatively in the political
process."28 7 They have argued that norms against judicial lobbying have
hindered the judiciary in the legislative budgetary process. 2 8 8 For
Douglas and Hartley, judicial lobbying is an unalloyed good because it
provides valuable information for legislators about the realities of
interpreting legislation.289
Neal Katyal takes an intermediate approach with regards to the
optimal level of judicial lobbying. He urges judges to embrace their role
as "advice-givers," but suggests that this role be confined to active cases
or controversies. 2 90 Although Katyal explicitly avoids the question of
whether judges should weigh in on policy matters, 2 91 he does suggest
that judges have some limited role to play vis-A-vis Congress. He labels
such judicial advice-giving on policy matters as "prescription." 29 2 For
him, prescription should be limited:
The advantage of prescription is that it permits relatively
intellectual federal judges with life tenure to impart their
286. See Dennis Crouch, An Open Letter from Judge Rader, PATENTLYO (June 30, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/letter-judge-rader.html
[https://perma.cc/UGY5-JPG3]
(publishing Chief Judge Rader's statement that he regrets not offering an amendment including
copyright and trademark cases within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction).
287. Hartley, supra note 10, at 395; see also Roger E. Hartley & James W. Douglas, Budgeting
for State Courts: The Perceptionsof Key Officials Regarding the Determinants of Budget Success,

24 JUST. SYS. J. 251, 260 (2003).
288. See Hartley & Douglas, supranote 287, at 258-60.
289. Id.
290. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1716-19 (giving three examples of judicial advice-giving"clarification," "self-alienation," and "personification"-all of which take place through judicial
opinion writing).
291. Id. at 1719 (stating that judges commenting on "policy issues" is not the concern of his
article).
292. Id. at 1719.
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nonbinding wisdom to politicians. Many prescriptive matters are
routine, such as the annual tradition whereby some Supreme

Court justices go before Congress and testify about the Court's
budget and similar matters. Recommenaanons to Congress

about the asbestos litigation crisis may be a less obvious but
equally valid example of legitimate prescription because courts
have a special expertise in understanding the nature of the crisis
and recommending specific solutions. The most tenuous
prescriptive situations occur when judges expound on matters of
general policy when they have no structural expertise in the
subject matter.293
Katyal is concerned here with expertise. If judges have no relevant
expertise to add to legislative debates, their lobbying efforts do little to
further interbranch dialogue.2 94
Despite Douglas's and Hartley's views that judicial lobbying is nearly
universally beneficial, Katyal's intermediate view of the value of such
lobbying strikes the correct balance between productive congressional
information-gathering and troublesome judicial overreach. The closer
that judges get to law-makers, the more tenuous the legitimacy of
judicial decisions becomes.295 Judges who lobby against particular laws
for which they have little expertise are likely to be viewed skeptically
when required to interpret those laws in court. For example, many critics
chided Chief Justice Rehnquist for his lobbying efforts against the
passage of the Violence Against Women Act. 296 But even more strident
criticism arose when the court he chaired later struck down portions of
that Act.297
But specialized courts would seem to overcome Katyal's concern
about judicial expertise, at least superficially. Such courts, almost

293. Id.
294. See Mikva, supra note 94, at 1827 (complaining that judges "don't have that kind of knowhow" when it comes to selecting between competing policy choices).
295. See id. at 1829; Scheppele, supra note 157, at 1521 ("As both a coequal branch of
government and an impartial arbiter of disputes, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to solicit
money.").
296. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195, 2201

(1992) (arguing that the Chief Justice's actions were inappropriate).
297. See, e.g., Benjamin Black, Note: The Strange Career of VA WA: ChiefJustice Rehnquist and

the Shift from "Political"to "Constitutional"Federalism1990-2000, 16 J.L. & POL. 499, 515-17
(2000) (arguing on federalism grounds that the Chief Justice overstepped his jurisdiction); Sally F.
Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Uses and Abuses of

Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 70-75 (2003) (same); Resnik, supra note 41, at 275-78
(arguing that the Chief Justice lobbied against the Violence against Women Act).
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assuredly, have expertise in their given subject matter.298 Objections to
specialized judicial lobbying therefore must rely on something more
than critiques of the value of judicial input. But specialized court
lobbying may pose even greater risks than generalized court lobbying.
The Federal Circuit experience again provides an example. In a closely
watched case-referred to as the Myria99 case-the Southern District
of New York invalidated a patent on the BRCAl gene, a gene mutation
that greatly increases a woman's risk of breast cancer. The district judge
in Myriad invalidated the patent for lacking the requisite "patent-eligible
subject matter"-essentially that genes were not patentable because they
were laws of nature. 30
Before oral argument at the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Rader sat on
a panel of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), an industry
organization that often features Federal Circuit judges. 30 1 During the
panel discussion, Chief Judge Rader critiqued the law of patent-eligible
subject matter, suggesting that it was "subjective, and, to be frank, it's
politics. It's what you believe in your soul, but it isn't the law."3 02 The
winning plaintiffs in the Myriad case filed a motion to have Chief Judge
Rader recused from the appellate panel (which had yet to be
assigned).303 They argued that Chief Judge Rader's comments
"expressed his views on this specific case," and "did so in front of an
audience that was heavily biased in favor of one party." 304 The Federal
Circuit denied the motion, but Chief Judge Rader did not ultimately
appear on the panel that reversed the district court's decision.305
Federal judges that comment on policy matters invariably run the risk
of prejudicing, or appearing to prejudice, future cases. But that risk is
much higher for specialized courts that hear a high volume of cases in

298. The Federal Circuit is less of a specialized court and more of a centralized court. Ultimately,
the expertise of a centralized court should exceed that of a generalist court.

299. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad), 702 F. Supp.
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
300. Id. at 183.
301. John T. Aquino, Finding Gene Patents UnpatentableToo Blunt an Approach, PanelistsSay,

BNA's PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIG1rT J. 47 (May 14, 2010).
302. Id.
303. Motion by Plaintiffs-Appellees for Recusal of Chief Judge Randall R. Rader at 6, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No.
2010-1406).
304. Id.
305. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), remanded to 467 Fed. App'x 890 (2012) (J. Lourie,
Bryson, and Moore).
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their specialized subject area. Indeed, Chief Judge Michel's letter to
Congress urging restraint on patent damage reform greatly impacted the
outcome of pending cases.306 He repeatedly urged Congress to leave
damages reform to the court, while simultaneously urging litigants to
challenge particular sorts of damage calculations.307 Congress delayed
debate on damage reform pending the then-upcoming case of Microsoft
v. Lucent.3 08 With such a highly watched case-both by litigants and
congressmen-the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to do precisely
what Chief Judge Michel had promised: update the law of patent
damages in the court rather than legislatively. 3 09 In an opinion authored
by Chief Judge Michel, Lucent significantly altered the evidence
required to award damages in patent cases.310 Of course, using individual
cases as vehicles for achieving political goals comes at a cost.
Commentators, not to mention Lucent, whose jury damage award was
overturned, felt that case was largely a political decision, not a legal
one.3 1 ' These sorts of quasi-legislative judicial actions threaten the
judiciary's reputation for fairness and evenhandedness.
Furthermore, lobbying by the judiciary implicates concerns of
capture.312 Judges are very successful when they lobby Congress about
pending legislation, especially specialized judges with specialized
expertise. t For example, the America Invents Act was shaped, in large
part, by judicial lobbying efforts.3 14 The success of judicial lobbying is
likely to attract special interests. To the extent that the judiciary engages

&

306. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219; Letter
from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supranote 227.
307. See Michel, supra note 219 at 2.
308. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. (Microsoft v. Lucent), 580 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
309. Id. at 1327-31. For more on patent injunctions (as opposed to money damages), see Sarah
W. Rajec, TailoringRemedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 733, 751-58 (2012).
310. Id. at 1327-35.
311. See Mark A. Lemley, DistinguishingLost Profitsfrom Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM.
MARY L. REv. 655, 662 n.34 (2009) (critiquing the Lucent case as "confus[ing] the entire market
value rule with the question of royalty base").
312. For a full treatment of the topic of capture of courts, see J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture
(forthcoming 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
313. See Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, "Separatenessbut Interdependence, Autonomy but
Reciprocity": A First Look at Federal Judges' Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46

MERCER L. REv. 667, 669-75 (1995) (finding that Congress nearly always took the advice ofjudges
when lobbying on issues ofjudicial functioning).
314. See J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63

AM. U. L. REv. 961, 962-69 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's lobbying efforts shaped
Congress's approach to patent reform).
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in lobbying on substantive policy matters, they risk being coopted by
private lobbying organizations. This risk is heightened for specialized
courts, which are already thought to be more prone to capture than
generalist courts.315
B.

Specialization'sRole in JudicialLobbying

Why do judges, particularly specialized judges, lobby? This section
theorizes three key differences between the ways that specialist judges
and generalist judges view the legislative process. These differences may
help explain the prominent role that specialized judges often take in
legislative battles.
1.

Expertise

The concept of specialization is often conflated with expertise. While
the two terms are not synonyms, there are good reasons to suspect that
specialized judges gain valuable expertise in their subject matter.3 16
Judges who hear hundreds of cases within a particular field are more
likely to develop strategies for effectively adjudicating disputes than
judges who hear only a handful of such cases. This adjudicative
expertise can prove extremely valuable for legislators, particularly when
proposed legislation involves aspects of judicial procedure. Indeed,
Congress nearly always seeks input from the judiciary when considering
statutory changes to the judicial system.3 17 Judges are often called to
testify during legislative debates surrounding changes to the judicial
system. 318 Also, they are frequently appointed by Congress to sit on
committees or commissions to review court reform proposals.3 19
In addition to the generalized adjudicatory knowledge that judges
develop, Congress tends to view judges on specialized courts as experts
in the substantive policy that those courts review.320 This is less true for
315. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?: An Essay
on Delegation and Specializationof the JudicialFunction, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 775-91 (1983).
316. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuitand the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two

Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv 553, 555 (2010) (describing the Federal Circuit's
"exclusive hold" over its specialized caseload).
317. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 669-75 (finding that Congress nearly always took
the advice ofjudges when lobbying on issues ofjudicial functioning).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Consider that Congress often calls bankruptcy judges to testify about proposed reform. See,
e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 PENN. L. REv. 631, 636 (2015)
(chronicling the formation of the Federal Circuit and how Congress intended the court to function as
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generalist courts. Congress often seeks input from specialized judges
when reviewing the statutory regime governed by those judges.
Conversely, generalist judges are usually called to testify before
Congress about more court-specific matters.32 1
Congressional reliance on specialized judicial input is not unique to
Article III judges. Congress is quite open to hearing from bankruptcy
judges about substantive changes to the bankruptcy statute. 322 Similarly,
tax court judges are often called to testify about updates of the tax
code. 323 These are not examples of judges testifying about the impact of
legislation on the courts. Instead, these are instances of Congress looking
to the courts for substantive policy guidance.324 Clearly, Congress views
specialized judges (whether administrative courts or not) as having
valuable insight not only about the process of adjudication, but about the
substantive goals of legislation in their jurisdictional area.325
Judges on specialized courts tend to view themselves as policy
specialists as well.326 Opinions from the Federal Circuit routinely refer to
Congress's mandate to the court to "promote a uniform interpretation" of
the patent laws.327 Former Chief Judge Rader has been known to
criticize the Supreme Court for misunderstanding patent law.328 Thus,
"an expert" court).

321. Rishikof& Perry, supra note 313, at 679-80 (finding that of 275 known instances ofjudicial
testimony, 125 addressed "court administration").
322. For instance, in March of 2014, Judge Sontchi testified before Congress regarding two
issues. He testified that the safe harbor for derivatives was too broad and also urged Congress to
eliminate the safe harbors for repurchase agreements. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial and Antitrust Law, H Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 26, 2014) (statement of the

Honorable Christopher S. Sontchi, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Delaware).
323. If judged by number of appearances, the judges of the tax court are particularly useful to
Congress. See, e.g., Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Containedin the InternalRevenue Code:
Hearings on Recommendations for Civil Tax Penalty Reform and H.R. 2528 Before the Subcomm.

on Oversight ofH Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st Cong. 1 (1989).
324. Id.
325, See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 67-68 (1997) ("[lIt might be useful

for judges with experience in interpreting statutes to testify as to the technical difficulty in
discerning congressional meaning.").
326. Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Understandingthe FederalCircuit: A Model of Expert DecisionMaking, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/PedrazaFarinaLaura IPSCjaper_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ98-R9U7j.
327. See Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Congress created this court to
promote a uniform interpretation of the patent laws.") (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d
874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); but see Lisa L. Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65,
111-12 (2015) (critiquing patent law's goal of uniformity and proposing that the patent system
embrace more "patent experimentalism").
328. See Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader on the Supreme Court and Judge Posner,
IPWATCHDOG (June 28, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com [https://perma.cc/E3R3-
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the perception-shared by Congress and the court-of specialized
courts' policy expertise likely drives much of specialized judicial
lobbying. While most judges are not experts in any particular area other
than adjudication, specialized judges come to be viewed and to view
themselves as experts in their specialized field.3 2 9 Indeed, the judges on
the FISA Court who have lobbied for surveillance reform have engaged
in very little lobbying as district judges. It would appear that being a
member of a specialized court bestows a perception of specialized
knowledge on judges.
The difference in perceived value of specialized versus nonspecialized judicial input also helps explain the relative dearth of
lobbying by generalist judges. Generalist courts have played prominent
roles in lobbying for and against changes to circuit court boundaries and
legislation about court administration.3 30 Judges rightly consider
themselves experts on such matters. No one has more experience with
court organization and procedural rules than judges. Congress has also
been very responsive when judges weigh in on such matters. 331 Such
responsiveness indicates that Congress shares the judges' view of
themselves as experts in adjudication.
2.

Specialized Docket

Beyond specialization, specialized courts may also lobby for
legislative change because the impact of that change is more acutely felt
on specialized courts. For example, the Federal Circuit was very active
in legislative lobbying during the recent legislative patent reform
precisely because of the potential impact that legislation would have had
on the workings of the court.332 Legislative changes to the patent system
fundamentally impact the members of the federal circuit.333 For example,
legislative changes to damages law would have impacted a great number

4ATQ].
329. For proof, look no further than the Tax Court judges, who often are called to testify before
Congress as experts. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact ofPatents, 84 WASH. U. L.
REv. 573, 600-07 (2006) (discussing patent cases dealing with subject matter from juice machines
to biological research at the Federal Circuit).
330. See supra section I.B.
331. Smith, supranote 10, at 190.
332. See Anderson, supra note 314, at 1014-17 (arguing that the Federal Circuit was interested in
patent reform because such reform would have an impact on the court).
333. See Michel, supra note 227, at 2 (stating that proposed changes would "require[] a massive
damages trail in every case" and "the meaning of various phrases in the bills would be litigated for
many years").
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of the court's cases.334 Thus, lobbying makes sense for a court looking to
protect its domination over patent law.
The same is less true of generalist courts. Those courts usually do not
feel the same impact when legislative changes occur because their
docket is much more diverse than the docket of specialized courts. 33 5 For
generalist judges, it is usually not worth the effort to lobby for statutory
change because the number of cases an individual judge receives in any
particular legal area is relatively small. Thus, a judge with strong views
about copyright law is unlikely to put forth the effort required to
influence Congress because he or she will only see a handful of
copyright cases, if any, in a given year. 36 Of course, this is less true in
areas in which generalist courts see a large number of cases. And it is
often in those areas that produce large volumes of cases that generalist
courts actively lobby Congress.3 37 For instance, generalist judges hear
hundreds of criminal drug cases every year and have thus made
sentencing guidelines for criminal cases-particularly for drug
offenses-a lobbying priority. 3 3
3.

Conflation ofJudicialAdministration and Policy

For specialized courts, altering the scope of the law implicitly alters
the administrative burden of judging. New laws can lead to special
administrative burdens for specialized courts as they struggle to handle a
greatly enhanced caseload.339 In this way, the traditional dividing line
between "judicial-" and "policy-" based legislation, while always blurry,
completely evaporates for specialized courts.340 Changes in policy can
334. Id.
335. See Douglas A. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists Versus
Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 788, 789-90 (2013) (comparing the United States, where
fewer than one percent of court cases involve questions of antitrust, to India, where all antitrust
disputes are heard by specialist judges).
336. The exception to that generally applicable rule is the case of Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, who
had 298 copyright filings in 2013 and 197 filings in 2014. This appears to be the result of various
suits against people accused of illegally downloading movies. For more information about copyright
litigation, see generally Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an EmpiricalStudy, 100 IOWA L. REV.
1105 (2015); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. DistrictCourts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming).
337. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politicsof Sentencing, 105 COLuM. L. REV.
1276, 1281-86 (2005) (listing those lobbying for and against sentencing reform).
338. See id
339. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
340. For examples in which policy-based reforms have a jurisdictional affect, see Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Rethinking FederalCircuitJurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1495-1500 (2012). For an
example of how the Supreme Court can alter the power of a specialized court, see J. Jonas
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also result in jurisdictional changes for specialized courts.34 1
The conflation of administration and policy on specialized courts can
also insulate those courts' lobbying actions from criticism. Specialized
judges couch their critiques of policy in administrative terms. Consider
the Federal Circuit's Chief Judge Michel writing to the Senate Judiciary
Committee about patent reform.3 4 2 Although many of the issues he was
concerned about were fundamentally about policy choices-i.e. how
patent damages should be calculated and whether claim construction
should be appealable before final judgment-he framed his concerns as
administrative ones.343 In his view, allowing claim construction appeals
would overwhelm the Federal Circuit with new appeals. 34 This is an
administrative complaint, but it goes to a fundamental policy issue about
how and when claim construction is conducted and reviewed on appeal.
Similarly, he argued that judges were administratively incapable of
calculating damage awards under Congress's proposed regime.3 45 This is
a critique about the basic calculation of patent damages, framed in the
language of administration.
Similarly, Judge Bates's critiques of the USA Freedom Act were, on
their face, administrative ones. In his view, allowing a third-party
advocate to take a position opposite the government in every case would
have been wasteful and led to unnecessarily prolonged trials.346 This is
an administrative complaint. But the legislative debate is about a key
policy issue: how much discretion the government should have to
monitor its citizens' communications. At specialized courts, these policy
issues overlap with administrative concerns. Thus, the norms against
judicial lobbying rarely, if ever, apply for specialized courts.
Similar overlaps exist in legislative debates about jurisdiction and

Anderson, Specialized StandardsofReview, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 151 (2015).
341. See id.
342. See notes 219-227 and accompanying text.
343. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supra note 227, at 2 (suggesting that
changes to damages law would be "extremely costly and time-consuming"); Letter from Paul R.
Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219, at 1 (suggesting that altering the law
regarding claim construction would bog the court down in new cases).
344. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219, at 1-2
(arguing against changes to claim construction doctrine because they would slow down the Federal
Circuit's work).
345. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supra note 227, at 2 (suggesting that
changes to damages law would be "extremely costly and time-consuming").
346. See Letter from John Bates to Dianne Feinstein, supra note 1, at 2 (claiming that the
proposed legislation was unnecessary); Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supra note 1, at 2
(same); Letter from John D. Bates to Barack Obama, supra note 211 (same).
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policy Congress usually engages with the judiciary when it considers
changes to junsdictional rules.347 Jur1sdictional rules define which sorts
of disputes are appropnate to bnng within a particular court, and which
are not. 34 8 For speciaiizea courts, like tne Fecierai Circuit, junsaiction is
defined by subject matter, not geography. 349 Thus, when Congress
contemplates altering substantive law in an area supervised by a
specialized court, it simultaneously must contemplate the jurisdictional
consequences of such an action. Indeed, recent changes to the patent
statute have seriously altered the types and number of cases that arrive at
the Federal Circuit. 35 0 This change in the court's docket is the result of
the America Invents Act creating a host of new post-issuance
proceedings at the Patent and Trademark Office. 3 5 1 These proceedings
have proven exceedingly popular with litigants and have diverted some
litigation from the courts. 352 Thus when Congress threatens to make
jurisdictional decisions, specialized courts may rightly feel that they
must lobby Congress if those decisions threaten the court's docket.
C.

PlacingLimits on Lobbying Activities by Judges

The success of judicial lobbying has not been ignored by
academics. 35 3 When judges lobby-particularly when the judicial branch
347. See generally Larry Kramer, The One-Eyed Are Kings: Improving Congress' Ability to
Regulate the Use ofJudicialResources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 72, 79 (1991) (referring to the

Administrative Office's mission as "seeking to advance the particular agenda of ... the judicial
branch["); Winkle IIi, supra note 40, at 264-68 (1985) (chronicling a case of jurisdictional reform
that was guided by judges); John W. Winkle 1,

Judges Before Congress: Reform Politics and

Individual Freedom, 22 POLITY 443, 446-53 (describing judicial testimony before Congress on
jurisdictional reform legislation).
348. For example, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is defined at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
349. Id.
350. Consider that an "explosion" in patent suits (if not individual defendants, see Christopher A.
Cortropia et al., UnpackingPatentAssertion Entities, 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014) (finding that the
explosion was due to a change in joinder rules)) occurred after the America Invents Act. See GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY, GAO 13-465 (2013),

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQG2-YCJV] (finding a thirty-one
percent increase in patent infringement filings from 2010 to 2011).
351. See Paul M. Janicke, Overview of the New Patent Law of the United States, 21 TEXAS
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 67-72 (2013) (providing an overview of the changes to the post-grant review
procedures).
352. See Coleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post Grant
Review, STAN. TECH. L. REV. at *3-*4 (forthcoming) (finding that the first year ofpost-grant review
saw a 130-fold increase in filings over the last years of inter partes reexamination).
353. See Smith, supra note 10, at 190 (discussing the effectiveness of the unified judiciary before
Congress).
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lobbies with one voice-Congress listens.354 Judges hold a special
prestige among lawmakers; they are often asked to testify on matters of
congressional interest. 355 The judiciary's view on legislative reform
influences Congress for a number of reasons. First, federal judges have
life tenure and are restricted in their sources of income.356 Thus it is
thought that views of the judiciary are generally less biased than other
lobbying entities that might be seeking financial gain or improved career
prospects.35 7 Second, judges are considered experts in statutory
interpretation; therefore, their input on statutory language is often
welcomed.358 Third, a judge's job naturally exposes the judge to areas of
the law that may be in need of modification.359
Despite the appeal of judicial input, given the potential downsides of
judicial lobbying, discussed in section IV.A, supra, there may be
instances in which judicial lobbying should be restricted. 360 This section
will analyze three potential avenues of limiting judicial lobbying:
changing the ethical standards for judges as lobbyists, centralizing
judicial lobbying in judicial organizations, and centralizing only
specialized courts' lobbying efforts.361
Ultimately, this section concludes that the potential benefits of
judicial input in the legislative process outweigh the costs of such
lobbying.362 However, there is one area of judicial lobbying in which
some restrictive measures are advisable: that of specialized courts.
354. Id.
3 5 5. Id.
356. See Richard A. Posner, JudicialBehavior and Performance: An Economic Perspective, 32

FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1259, 1269 (2005) ("Moreover, not only is the judicial salary the same for all
district judges-there are no bonuses for outstanding performance-but a judge's ability to cash in
on his judicial reputation by moonlighting as a teacher or lecturer is very limited . . . .").
357. Id. ("It seems, then, that the federal judicial career has been carefully designed to insulate
the judges from the normal incentives and constraints that determine the behavior of rational
actors. . . .").
358. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 866-71 (1930)
(debunking the myth that judges are proficient at statutory interpretation); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353, 357 (1990) (contrasting
"traditional" statutory interpretation from the "unique" interpretation done in United States v. Jin
Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916)).
359. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1222-24 (discussing the exposure to federal issues that federal
judges enjoy).
360. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 855 ("Once it is admitted that some extrajudicial speech by
judges on legal topics is both permissible, desirable, and necessary, but that not all such speech is
advisable, it becomes problematic to draw a line to distinguish the acceptable from the
unacceptable." (emphasis in original)).
361. Id.
362. See Hartley, supranote 10, at 405-06 (discussing the advantages of lobbying).
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Specialized courts face unique bureaucratic pressures that incentivize
lobbying by judges in ways that are harmful to the legal system. 36 3
Specialized court lobbying also frequently occurs without opposing
viewpoints from non-specialized courts. 36
Specialized courts often have expertise in particular legal areas,
however. 6 s Therefore completely eliminating specialized lobbying is
less than ideal. Instead, this section outlines a means of funneling
judicial lobbying to a centralized body, such as the Judicial Conference.
Directing lobbying efforts through to a centralized body provides a
check on specialized court lobbying while still leveraging the beneficial
input that a specialized judiciary can provide to legislators.
1.

Change Ethical Standards

Perhaps the most obvious way to reign in judicial lobbying is to
change the ethical standards which regulate extra-judicial speech.366
Commentators have argued that Canon 4 of the Judicial Code of Ethics
restricts judges from opining on legislative issues that are unrelated to
the judiciary, but the Comptroller General has not agreed.367 Canon 4
could easily be amended to more explicitly restrict extra-judicial speech
by judges.6 8 Modifying Canon 4(A)(2) could be done thusly, with the
proposed modifications appearing in bold:
2. Consulting. A judge may consult with or appear at a public
hearing before an executive or legislative body or official, but
only when invited to do so or
(a) on matters of direct relevance to the judiciary as a whole;
(b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a
judge's judicial experience provides special expertise in the
area; or
(c) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving
the judge or the judge's interest

363. See Dreyfuss, supra note 215, at 5-7 (listing the potential drawbacks to specialized courts).
364. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV.
1755, 1766 (1997) (finding that the Federal Circuit does not face intellectual competition).
365. See Golden, supra note 316, at 557 (acknowledging the Federal Circuit's and the D.C.
Circuit's expertise).
366. See supra section U.B.
367. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 10, at 1203-04 (highlighting the Comptroller General's role in
lobbying restrictions).
368. For instance, it could be amended to explicitly outlaw certain types of judicial speech that
was found to endanger fairness.
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Such explicit restrictions on judicial speech, however, encounter two
primary counter-arguments: one constitutional and one practical. Any
restriction on speech is likely to be challenged on First Amendment
grounds. 369 Judges enjoy the same First Amendment speech rights as
regular citizens. 370 Thus, completely forbidding judicial speech on
political matters appears to be a clear violation of those rights.371
Constitutional problems aside, using ethical standards to restrict
judicial lobbying poses a practical problem: blanket restrictions on
judicial input in legislative matters limit one of the most effective
sources of information for lawmakers.3 72 Judges often have keen insights
into the operation of the law, even in areas unrelated to management of
the judicial system. 73 Because judges regularly encounter thorny issues
of statutory interpretation and are forced to infer the legislature's intent
in drafting statutes, they can readily identify problematic legal areas for
Congress to consider amending. Oftentimes, this dialogue about
lawmaking occurs through the formal processes of law-creation
(legislating) and law-interpretation (judging).374 But this dialogue need
not always be formal. There may be occasions where a more informal
process of dialogue could serve the law-making process more
effectively. 375
Thus, blanket restrictions on judicial lobbying are likely to lead to less
effective law-making. Judges provide unique insights into the American
legal

system.

37 6

Eliminating their

input would

severely hamper

legislative efforts to improve the administration and functioning of the
law. Judges also often provide Congress with less-partisan input than do
private lobbyists.

369. See Leonard E. Gross, JudicialSpeech: Discipline and the FirstAmendment, 36 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1181, 1190-99 (1986) (discussing the various implications of restricting judicial speech).
370. Id. at 1261.
371. See id. at 1196-97; Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 309-12 (1978)
(proposing restrictions on political speech).
372. See Reinhart, supra note 103, at 805 (urging judges to "educate" the public about matters of
particular expertise).
373. Id
374. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 13 (1970).

375. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1097-1106 (listing examples of less formal dialogue
between the branches).

376. See Reinhart, supranote 103, at 805 (urging judges to "educate" the public about matters of
particular expertise).
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Centralize JudicialLobbying Activities

As an alternative to aosoiute or partial limitations on the amount o1
judicial lobbying that can take place, there are good reasons to consider
centralizing judicial lobbying activities in a single organization. The
most logical organization would be the Judicial Conference, which
currently engages in lobbying activities for the judiciary and is headed
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 7 The Judicial Conference
has a long history of dialogue between the judicial and legislative
branches.378
Among the advantages of centralizing judicial lobbying is that it
would force the judiciary to speak with one voice on issues that impact
federal judges. Currently, the judiciary uses the Judicial Conference to
voice its opinion on matters that directly impact judicial pay,
jurisdiction, and institutions.37 9 For example, the Judicial Conference has
been on the forefront of lobbying for increased judicial salaries, going so
far as to bring a suit against the United States government.380
Going a step further and restricting judicial lobbying activities to
those of the Judicial Conference would require the judiciary to focus its
lobbying efforts on those issues that are of particular importance.
Controversial policy positions would be unlikely to garner enough
support to be pushed through the Judicial Center. 38 1 Furthermore,
individual spats between judges (even judges on the same court) would
largely be shielded from the public's view. 3 82
But there are a number of downsides to consolidating lobbying
power. First, doing so elevates the power and status of the Judicial
Center, an organization which is not subject to direct voter oversight.
Granting veto power over lobbying to the institution might increase the
bureaucratic tendency to increase power and control at the expense of

377. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 989
(1996).
378. Id. at 993-95 (describing the interactions that take place between the judiciary and Congress
as a result of the Judicial Conference's activities).
379. See Richard L. Vining & Teena Wilhelm, The Chief Justice as Advocate-in-Chief 95
JUDICATURE 267, 268-75 (2012) (reviewing Chief Justice Robert's time as head of the judicial
conference).
380. Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that federal judges were
entitled to back pay and cost-of-living adjustments).
381. Compare that to the situation in which Judge Kozinzki and Judge Bates were publically in
disagreement. Compare Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supra note 1, with Letter from

Alex Kozinski to Patrick Leahy, supranote 6.
382. As occurred on the FISA court recently. See Carr, supranote 249; Levy, supranote 248.
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Second, the Judicial Center is largely controlled by the Supreme
Court, in particular by the Chief Justice. 3" Previous Chief Justices as
well as the current one have come under attack tor their use of te
Judicial Center's lobbying function.385 If all judicial lobbying were
centralized, there would be more opportunity for judicial grand-standing
and politicking.
But perhaps most troubling would be the potential elimination of the
feedback loop between the judiciary and the legislature. Because judges
are familiar with various aspects of the law, their insight is very valuable
to lawmakers across the political spectrum.386 Silencing individual
judges under the larger Judicial Center bureaucracy threatens the less
formal conversations that take place between the legislative and judicial
branches.387 While it certainly may be beneficial to limit the instances in
which judges engage in judicial lobbying, any such limitations should be
done on a more fine-grained level. Policy makers should seek to limit
judicial lobbying in the instances in which there are significant
downsides to such lobbying, while encouraging judicial-legislative
dialogue in all other instances.
3.

Checking Lobbying by Specialized Courts

A more sensible approach to restrictions on judicial lobbying involves
a means of ensuring that specialized courts speak for the judiciary as a
whole, and not just for their court's interests. Lobbying by specialized
judges has numerous benefits. Specialized judges are thought to possess
specialized legal knowledge in ways that generalist judges are not.389
383. Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics ofJudicial Administration: Creating

the FederalJudicialCenter, 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 31, 44 (1988) ("With its increased size,
however, the Conference became in many ways a non-deliberative body to validate committee
recommendations, giving the committees considerable power to shape Conference policy on matters
such as legislation.").
384. Id. at 44-45 (describing the increased influence of the Chief Justice during Earl Warren's
tenure).
385. Vining & Wilhelm, supranote 379, at 268-75 (detailing Chief Justice Roberts' role with the
Judicial Center); Resnik, supranote 41, at 270-75 (chronicling Chief Justice Rehnquist's impact on
VAWA); Goldfarb, supra note 297, 70-75 (criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist's conduct with
regards to VAWA).
386. Rishikof& Perry, supranote 313, at 669-75.
387. Hartley, supra note 10, at 405-06 (discussing the advantages of judicial-legislative
dialogue).
388. Id
389. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 364, at 1766 (assuming that specialized judges are more
knowledgeable in their subject matter that generalist judges).
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Specialized judges oversee a diverse range of legal areas, including tax,
patents, bankruptcy governmental employee benefits, and military
justice. 390 That expertise can prove very valuable to legislators who have
little experience with a particular area of the law 31
But lobbying by specialized judges has drawbacks that threaten
judicial legitimacy. These drawbacks center on perhaps the primary
concern of any specialized court: capture.392 Opponents of specialized
courts have long noted the potential for specialized court capture.393
Capture in this sense refers to a court aligning its interests with those of
its constituents.3 94 Capture concerns are greater for specialized courts
than for generalist ones because the litigants in specialized courts are
often repeat players who have a long term interest in gaining influence at
the court.395 At the same time, courts may feel the need to please those
repeat players in order to justify the court's existence and to expand (or
maintain) the court's jurisdiction and power.396
Concerns about specialized judicial capture raise doubts about both
the even-handedness of the court's lobbying efforts as well as the true
source of the policy opinions expressed during lobbying. Specialized
courts may be encouraged by frequent litigants to assert a particular
policy position publically, a position that may benefit the litigant more
than the public.39 7 Interestingly, specialized courts may do the reverse as
well: employing litigants to lobby on behalf of the court. Such was the
case when the Federal Circuit asked the patent bar to urge Congress to
leave patent reform to the court. 398 Such a symbiotic lobbying
relationship between bar and bench is symptomatic of the capture
worries expressed by specialized court skeptics.
390. Some of those judges, obviously, are Article I judges, including tax, military affairs and
bankruptcy judges. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing the tax court); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1295(a)(4), (a)(9) (giving the Federal Circuit control over patent appeals and government
employee appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (stating that bankruptcy judges hear cases filed in federal
district court).

391. See Rishikof& Perry, supra note 313.
392. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138

U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1147-53 (1990) (discussing capture as the preeminent concern in the creation
of specialized courts).
393. Id.
394. Id
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 156-57 (1985) (discussing capture concerns).
398. See J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of PatentReform at the Federal Circuit, 63

AMER. U. L. REv. 961, 999-1000 (detailing Chief Judge Michel's effort to use the bar to lobby
Congress).
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Furthermore, because the scope of specialized courts is defined by
subject matter and not geography, policy pronouncements from
specialized courts are indistinguishable from efforts to increase the
court's jurisdiction and power.399 Thus, skepticism is appropriate when
specialized courts argue for expanded legal protections in the areas over
which the court has jurisdiction. For example, a substantive change in
the bankruptcy law fundamentally impacts the workings of the
bankruptcy courts.40 0 Similarly, wholesale changes to the patent statute
have clear and direct consequences at the Federal Circuit.401 This
marriage of the administration of justice with substantive policy allows
specialized judges to couch their lobbying efforts in the acceptable
language of judicial efficiency. 402 For specialized courts, jurisdiction and
policy overlap in ways that muddy the already murky distinctions
between lobbying on policy issues and lobbying on judicial issues. Such
a conflation of policy-type debates with judicial-efficiency-type debates
is endemic in specialized courts.
Moreover, specialized court lobbying is much less likely to be
checked by other judges. When generalist judges lobby for substantive
policy changes, they are often rebuked by other judges or contradicted in
their views.403 These alternative judicial viewpoints provide members of
Congress with valuable counter-arguments which may help in
determining the best policy solution. On the other hand, specialized
courts often have no competing court with which to debate policy. 4 04 For
instance, since all military appeals are funneled through the Court of the
Armed Forces, no federal judges outside of that court have expertise
handling such appeals. 405 Thus, lobbying efforts from centralized
appellate courts often lack the critical review of other judges.
Perhaps most troubling, judicial lobbying by specialized judges poses
an increased risk that lobbying efforts will bias the judicial process.406
Lobbying efforts often entrench parties in their policy views. Taking
399. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a FederalCourt, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1864 (2013) (speculating that the Federal Circuit has unique incentives to enhance its powers
in certain areas).

400. See Countryman, supranote 147, at 42-45 (expressing skepticism that the bankruptcy courts
could handle the changes brought about by the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
401. Anderson, supranote 16, at 1075-76.
402. See suprasection IU.C.
403. Compare the experience of the Ninth Circuit debating proposals to divide the circuit. See
supra section II.B.l.a.
404. Wood, supra note 364, at 1766.
405. 10 U.S.C. §§ 810-946 (2012).
406. See, e.g., Tarkington, supranote 159, at 373-79 (discussing the downsides ofjudicial bias).
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positions that might impact or signal the outcome of future cases is the
primary concern of opponents of judicial lobbying.407 But for specialized
courts, lobbying about policy is almost certain to impact future cases.408
By the very nature of specialized courts, judges encounter a large
number of specific cases and gain expertise in that area. 40 9 When judges
weigh in on the particular policy debates of the day, those judges almost
necessarily will see cases that contain those issues in short order.4 10
Thus, judicial lobbying by specialized courts raises numerous concerns
about the potential for bias and capture.
At the same time, input from specialized judges is extremely valuable
when Congress is considering alterations to the statutes that such courts
oversee. 4 1 1 Therefore, it is necessary to constrain problematic lobbying
by specialized judges without eliminating the input that such judges can
provide.4 12 A mechanism for providing judicial perspective on potential
statutory updates that simultaneously checks capture and bias concerns
is the best solution for regulating specialized judicial lobbying.
Lobbying by specialized judges should therefore be conducted more
formally than the ad hoc manner in which most current judicial lobbying
occurs. 4 13 The Judicial

Conference

could bring a semblance

of

organization to judicial lobbying efforts. The Judicial Conference enjoys
broad participation by judges from all over the country.414 These judges
serve on a "network of committees" which could be utilized in vetting
specialized court lobbying proposals.4 15
Some sort of oversight from the judiciary as a whole (not necessarily
from the Judicial Center) is needed. First, oversight ensures that judicial
lobbying will take into account the larger legal universe in which the

407. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 856-57 (arguing that judges shouldn't speak publically on
issues that may arise in order to avoid "hopelessly compromis[ing] the integrity and impartiality of
the court for which she works").
408. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1069-76 (discussing changes to the Patent Act and
implications for the Federal Circuit).
409. See Golden, supra note 316, at 557.
410. See Anderson, supranote 16, at 1083-87 (giving as an example of reform the court getting a
case one month after proposed reform).

411. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 688-89 (noting the workings of the judicial and
legislative branches).
412. See Hartley, supranote 10, at 405-06 (proposing creating "space" for judges to lobby).
413. See Rishikof& Perry, supra note 313, at 687 (referring to judicial lobbying as "ad hocism").
414. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18176/download [https://penna.cc/H3P8-6JR7].
415. Id.
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416

Because specialized courts often
proposed legal changes operate.
operate without checks from other courts, this check on lobbying
activities would permit review of the lobbying proposals from other
judges with less personal investment in the outcome. Such oversight is
likely to check lobbying that could potentially bias a court; such as when
a court is contemplating commenting on legislation that the court will
have to review at a later date. Additionally, it would provide increased
input to specialized courts about the impact of their proposed changes.
A check on judicial lobbying would also serve as a relevance test for
specialized courts' lobbying activities. Oversight will help filter out
those efforts that have minimal impact on the judiciary.417 Conversely,
for those efforts that the judiciary supports, Congress and the general
public are likely to view the lobbying effort as representing the views of
418
Indeed, oversight of lobbying maintains the
the entire judiciary.
courts can provide to Congress. When
specialized
that
insight
valuable
the judiciary speaks with one voice, Congress can more confidently rely
on the assertions of the judicial branch; a confidence that is necessary for
efficient and productive judicial-congressional dialogue.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the judicial and legislative branches is
perhaps the most studied inter-branch relationship. The dialogue that
occurs between judges and congressmen occurs across the formal spaces
of law-making and opinion-writing, but it also occurs in the informal
interstices of the modem American political state. Judicial lobbying is a
vibrant part of our political system and one that is worth maintaining to a
large degree. Judicial input on statutory and constitutional questions is
vital at every stage of the law-making process. Encouraging judges to
provide input to legislators on the functioning of the judicial branch (and
encouraging congressmen to listen) should be the priority of any
potential legal or ethical modification to the process of judicial lobbying.
But judicial lobbying can have deleterious effects on the fairness of
the adjudicatory process, particularly at specialized courts. Lobbying by
judges on specialized courts can potentially lead to biased decisions and
416. See FISH, supra note 139, at 330-35.
417. The Center is governed by the nine-person Board of the Federal Judicial Center. See
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER: ANNUAL

REPORT 2013, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/

AnnRepl3.pdf/$file/AnnRepl3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y893-PZVF]. The Board is a diverse set of
judicial stakeholders (usually judges) that have a wide variety of interests and concerns. Id.
418. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 687-89 (summarizing judicial lobbying effort as
"ad hoc").
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special interest capture. Therefore, special concern should be paid to
lobbying efforts that originate from specialized judges. Specialized
courts face unique bureaucratic pressures that incentivize lobbying by
judges in ways that are harmful to the legal system.4 19 Judges risk
appearing biased when reviewing statutes that they have personally
lobbied against. Ultimately, the United States legal system is benefitted
when legislators have input from judges, but restrictions on lobbying
(particularly by specialized judges) are needed.

419. See Dreyfuss, supra note 215, at 5-7 (listing the potential drawbacks to specialized courts).
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